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Articles
Criminality and Sexual Morality in
New York, 1920-1980
William E. Nelson*
This article will examine some remarkable cyclical movements in the
law dealing with rape, prostitution, pornography, homosexuality, and
gender-related violence in New York State from 1920 to 1980.1 By
focusing on this single state, which for most of the period under study
was the most populous state and the economic and cultural leader of the
nation, the historian can examine both familiar leading cases and lesser-
known cases in the state's highest court, as well as the often revealing
work product of intermediate and trial court judges, who at times
* The author is indebted for their helpful suggestions and criticisms to his colleagues in the
Legal History Colloquium and the Faculty Workshops at New York University School of Law and
Mississippi College School of Law, especially to Paulette M. Caldwell, George Chauncey, Jr.,
Christopher M. Eisgruber, Sarah B. Gordon, Thomas C. Mackey, Mary Libby Payne, and Steven R.
Wilf. Financial assistance was provided by the Filomen D'Agostino Faculty Research Fund at New
York University.
1. This article is part of a more general study of the legal history of New York between 1920 and
1980. The scope of the larger study dictates, in part, the coverage of this article. Gender violence,
which some scholars see as related to the sex crimes discussed herein (see, for example, Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law [Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1987], 85-92), is included because the criminal law dealing with it developed in ways parallel
to the law dealing with sex crimes. Sexual harassment, which is also seen as related, see ibid., is not
included because it did not become a subject of legal control until the very last years of the period
under study, see ibid., 103, 251, and even today it remains a subject for civil rather than criminal
jurisdiction.
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responded more openly than higher-court judges to social and cultural
attitudes and pressures. Moreover, New York was in one important
respect more typical of the nation than any other single state: with its
metropolitan center on the Atlantic coast, its upstate industrial cities lit-
tle different from those of the Midwest, its expanding suburbs, and its
rural farmlands and environmentally protected woodlands, New York
contained locales similar to those in all the rest of the nation except the
Deep South and the Far West. One would accordingly expect to find a
wider variety of the socio-political forces that shape law in New York
than in other jurisdictions. Of course, those forces would converge dif-
ferently in New York than elsewhere, and the end legal product molded
by them would differ: for example, social forces emerging out of the met-
ropolitan center would have much greater weight in New York, where
the City typically contained nearly half of the state's population, than in
the nation at large, where New York City has never equalled even five
percent of total population. When adjustments are made for these differ-
ences in configuration, however, the findings that emerge from this study
about how socio-political forces influenced the law's treatment of sexual
immorality and gender-related violence in New York can serve as prelim-
inary hypotheses about more general national developments, at least
until scholars examine in similar detail the law governing sexual behavior
in other states such as California, Texas, and a Southeastern state like
Georgia.
The story begins simply enough, with a summary in Part I of legal
doctrine in the 1920s and 1930s. Although liberal breezes blew on occa-
sion during these two decades, New York judges, whose attitudes
reflected, however imperfectly, those of the broader culture from which
they were drawn, tended to keep a tight lid on speech, publications, and
movies that referred even obliquely to sex. During the same years most
judges also adopted a tough stance toward prostitution, even to the
extent of occasionally upholding convictions of the male customers of
prostitutes. The New York judiciary likewise showed no interest in giv-
ing homosexuals freedom to pursue their sexual practices. Until the
1940s, judges routinely defended conventional Victorian morality for the
twin purposes of preventing "disorder and anarchy" and protecting "our
women and children."
During and after World War II, changes began occurring in the law
dealing with sex offenses and gender-related violence. Part II will show
how doctrinal changes, especially in the rules of evidence, led by the
1960s to substantial decriminalization of prostitution and private, con-
sensual homosexual behavior. Legislation produced essentially the same
result in cases of wife battering and other family violence. In the case of
pornography, much decriminalization resulted from federal constitu-
tional adjudication. Finally, in the law of rape, procedural and eviden-
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tiary decisions led to practical decriminalization except in the case of
rape by strangers.
Part III will begin to explore the deeper concerns of this essay. The
article is organized around a central insight that during the 1940s, 1950s,
and 1960s, seemingly disparate developments in the law of homosexual-
ity and gender-related violence were linked to each other, and to develop-
ments in the law of rape, prostitution, and pornography, by a judicial
commitment to conferring sexual freedom on individuals, even when that
freedom was carried to excess. Again reflecting the culture of which they
were a part, New York judges evidenced their commitment to sexual
freedom not only by recognizing the legitimacy of "recreational sex," but
even more by refusing to punish men who carried their freedom to vio-
lent excess by committing either rapes or serious bodily assaults on
women. In cases such as these, judges tended to trivialize the harm that
was done, to understand the violence as a product of "circumstances over
which" men had "no control," and to express concern with saving the
potential of men to lead useful lives. By taking this approach, judges
effectively legitimated men's power to dominate women physically and
sexually.
In these middle decades of the century, few objections were raised to
this pattern of domination of women. By the 1970s, however, a new fem-
inist movement had been born, and women had begun to demand equal-
ity, freedom, and an end to domination by men. What, however, did
these demands mean?
Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, equality had been a coher-
ent idea, at least in American legal and constitutional thought. In cases
such as Brown v. Board of Education,2 courts had defined equality to
require that a persecuted group be granted the same rights that the domi-
nant group already possessed. If a white student with certain specified
qualifications had a right to attend a particular school, a black student
with the same qualifications had to be granted the same right to attend
that school. The assumption underlying Brown was that granting the
same rights to blacks that whites already enjoyed would put an end to
structures of racial domination.
Liberal feminists in the late 1960s, like the leaders of the civil rights
movement, hoped to confer practical freedom and equality on women by
granting women the same rights that men already enjoyed. In the eyes of
more radical feminists, however, such a strategy would achieve neither
practical freedom nor true equality. In order to free women from the
threat of physical domination in the form of rape and gender-related
assaults, more radical feminists wanted to restrain aggressiveness on the
part of men. Radical feminists also saw pornography and prostitution as
2. 347 U.s. 483 (1954).
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mechanisms that taught men to view women as objects over which to
exert sexual domination, thereby encouraging male aggression.
Radical feminists holding such views wanted to extend the law prohib-
iting rape, prostitution, pornography, and gender assaults. To the extent
that self-interest on the part of men dictated that they be free to engage in
some of these activities, or at least not be severely punished if they over-
stepped legitimate bounds, radical feminists articulated a competing self-
interest on the part of women in reducing or eliminating male freedom.
Furthermore, they demanded that women's interests in controlling male
sexuality be given preference when they conflicted with men's interests in
sexual freedom.
With some feminists campaigning to ensure that women received the
same treatment as men, with others seeking to put an end to male physi-
cal and sexual domination, and with most men standing for the status
quo, the coherence that had characterized the law of sexual and gender
relations in the 1950s and early 1960s evaporated. Part IV, which
returns to the analysis of statutory and doctrinal development in these
areas of New York law, will display the emerging confusion. In particu-
lar, this section will show that when feminists of all political stripes,
together with conservative protectors of conventional morality, agreed
on the need for legal change, as they did with regard to the law of rape
and family violence, the law moved dramatically in the direction of
recriminalization. On the subjects of prostitution and pornography,
however, where liberal feminists continued to support decriminalization
while radical feminists joined conservatives in seeking recriminalization,
little doctrinal change occurred. And where, as in the case of homosexu-
ality, radical feminists joined libertarians in favoring decriminalization,
conservatives in New York lost, and a constitutional right to engage in
private, consensual sodomy was proclaimed.
I. THE PERPETUATION OF VICTORIAN STANDARDS, 1920-1940
The reported New York cases from the 1920s and 1930s establish
beyond doubt that the era was one of continuing, and perhaps even
expanded, judicial enforcement of Victorian sexual norms.3 The law
dealing with pornography, prostitution, homosexuality, rape, and gen-
der-related violence performed two functions during the decades in ques-
tion. First, it gave effect to a widely shared societal moral code that
directed respectable, upper-class people like judges to restrain themselves
from engaging in, reading about, or even discussing the sexual activities
3. A possible exception was People on Complaint of Savory v. Gotham Book Mart, 285 N.Y.S.
563, 567 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1936), in which a magistrate found "unwelcome" the idea of "a
judge-made list of what people should or should not read." One other case made a passing reference
to the belief of some individuals, other than the judge, that prostitution should be decriminalized.
See People v. Anonymous, 292 N.Y.S. 282, 286 (Magis. Ct. Kings County 1936).
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considered in this essay. Second, it turned to criminal sanctions in an
effort, the success of which cannot be perfectly measured, to prevent "the
great lower class" from breaching sexual norms and thereby "poison[ing]
society all around them."4
Although a loosening of sexual standards may have occurred in society
at large during the 1920s,- strong pressures for legal enforcement of Vic-
torian sexual norms remained. The 1920s were the decade of Prohibi-
tion, which reformers hoped would result, among other things, in a
reduction of male violence against wives and children.6 Indeed, the
advocates of Prohibition were even hopeful that it would "stimulate a
vast process of national purification" that would include "the sublima-
tion of the sex instinct upon which the next stage of progress for the
human race so largely depends."' The early years of the decade were
also a time when the Committee of Fourteen, a New York anti-vice
group, sent private investigators out to monitor places of prostitution and
sought legislation to facilitate the arrest of the male customers of prosti-
tutes.' They were also part of the era during which medico-legal experts
were creating and imposing a new allegedly inferior status of homosexu-
ality upon those who engaged in sex acts with individuals of their own
gender-acts that at an earlier time had been understood, like adultery,
as merely sinful rather than indicative of a person's fundamental iden-
tity.9 Societal hostility to homosexuality thus continued unabated.'o
Societal pressure for the suppression of pornography also endured.
The New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, founded by Anthony
Comstock and led by him until his death in 1915, remained active into
the 1930s in seeking legislation against pornography, in instituting court
cases, and even in burning confiscated literature." Over sixty books
were banned in Boston in 1927, while as late as 1938, new anti-vice orga-
4. Quoted in Paul S. Boyer, Purity in Print: The Vice-Society Movement and Book Censorship in
America (New York: Scribner, 1968), 4. On the class aspects of the law's repressive policies during
the 1920s and 1930s, see ibid., 3-10, and Barbara Meil Hobson, Uneasy Virtue: The Politics of
Prostitution and the American Reform Tradition (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 163.
5. See John D'Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in
America (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 222-48, 256-60; and Kevin F. White, "The Flapper's
Boyfriend: The Revolution in Morals and the Emergence of Modem American Male Sexuality,
1910-1930" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1990), 318-91.
6. See Linda Gordon, Heroes of their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence,
Boston, 1880-1960 (New York: Viking, 1988), 141-46.
7. Robert A. Woods, "Prohibition and Social Hygiene," Social Hygiene 5 (1919): 137, 144.
8. See Thomas C. Mackey, Hammer at Vice: The Use of Law for Moral Reform and the
Changing Business of Prostitution in New York City, 1900-1932 (forthcoming).
9. See John D'Emilio, Sexual Politics; Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual
Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 10-20;
George Chauncey, Jr., "Christian Brotherhood or Sexual Perversion? Homosexual Identities and the
Construction of Sexual Boundaries in the World War I Era," in Hidden from History: Reclaiming
the Gay and Lesbian Past, ed. Martin B. Duberman, Martha Vicinus, and George Chauncey, Jr.
(New York: NAL Books, 1989), 294.
10. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 22.
11. See Boyer, Purity in Print, Illustration no. 7.
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nizations, like the National Organization for Decent Literature, were still
being formed. 2 Thus, it is not surprising that even in the late 1930s,
when one New York judge took note of a 40 percent increase in sex
offenses in 1936 and a 110 percent increase in 1937, he saw a need for a
"drive today against sex perverts, all forms of vice engendered by loose
morals, and even positive degeneracy."' 3
The view just expressed was not unusual. As future Senator Robert F.
Wagner argued, the struggle against vice demonstrated the need for laws
for the protection of women and children similar to those that had saved
them "from exploitation by the unscrupulous employer."' 4 Judges felt
duty-bound to prevent any " 'lecherous swing causing a corruption of the
moral tone of the[se] susceptible members' of the community."' 5 They
felt they had a right to expect that the general tone of morality in
America would be at least equal to that of earlier cultures such as nine-
teenth-century Paris.' 6 Their goal was to elevate moral standards to an
even higher plane, with less vice and crime,' 7 and thus they were always
concerned that "those who are subject to perverted influences"-the
"immature, the moron, the mentally weak, or the intellectually impover-
ished"-"might be aroused to lustful and lecherous practices."'" Indeed,
some judges seem to have viewed sex outside the context of a monoga-
mous marriage as so "despicable"' 9 that they hesitated even to speak
about the topic.
People v. Clark, from which the language just quoted was drawn, will
illustrate. The Clark case was a prosecution for attempted rape in which
the district attorney asked the following questions on recross-
examination:
Q. Are you the fellow when she was up at the Hotel Niagara
with another boy to a dance, that tucked under the windshield wiper
of his car, a little envelope saying, "For Mary," with a couple of
c _ (contraceptive appliances) in it? A. No, sir.
12. See Felice Flanery Lewis, Literature, Obscenity, and Law (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1976), 102, 135-36.
13. Ultem Publications v. Arrow Publications, 2 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1938).
14. People v. Seltzer, 203 N.Y.S. 809, 813 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1924).
15. People v. Friede, 233 N.Y.S. 565, 569 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1929), quoting Liveright v.
Waldorf Theaters Corp., 221 N.Y.S. 194, 196 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1927). As in this note, references
for quotations within the cited source will be provided whenever available. In some notes below,
however, such references cannot be verified and are, accordingly, not given. Typically, though not
invariably, unverifiable references are to trial testimony or other material contained in trial records.
16. See Halsey v. New York Soc'y for the Suppression of Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 13 (1922) (dissenting
opinion). For another, later case in which sexual attitudes in New York were compared with those
in another city, see People v. London, 63 N.Y.S.2d 227, 231 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1946), in
which the magistrate rejected "a bedroom view of the sex life and the sex abnormalities of the
peculiar type of human animal that flourishes in the lush regions of Hollywood and Southern
California."
17. See Halsey, 234 N.Y. 1, 6.
18. Friede, 233 N.Y.S. 565, 568.
19. People v. Clark, 2 N.Y.S.2d 433, 434 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1937).
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Q. Are you the fellow who did that? A. No, sir.
Q. Are you the fellow who, the night before last, appeared on
her father's lawn and left a couple of c (contraceptive
appliances) on his lawn? * * * A. No, sir.
In the court's view, the mere recital of these questions, which implied
that "the defendant was guilty of the despicable conduct which they sug-
gest," was so prejudicial that it required reversal of the defendant's
conviction.2 °
The notion that the mere mention of sex was something in which
respectable people like district attorneys and judges ought not even
engage was repeated again and again in judicial opinions of the 1920s and
1930s. In People v. Hall,2" a case of attempted sodomy in which the
court gave vent to its passion against the "abnormal perversion" and
against a defendant who "had a passion toward his own sex that was
unnatural," the "nature of the case preclude[d] a discussion of the facts"
which alone could answer the question of "[w]ho would [possibly] com-
mit such a crime. "22 In Hall, of course, the court was merely following
the ancient common law view about the unspeakable quality of homosex-
ual behavior, but in other cases judicial reticence extended to a broader
variety of sexual matters. The most plausible reading of the text of Peo-
ple v. Clark suggests that condoms were a subject unfit for judicial men-
tion, while in Halsey v. New York Society for the Suppression of Vice,23
the dissenting judge, at least, found it inappropriate "to spread upon our
pages all the indecent and lascivious part[s]" of the book the Society was
seeking to suppress. Similarly, in People v. Berg,25 the Appellate Divi-
sion declined to name the book it was suppressing or to describe its con-
tents, so as not "to excite the curiosity of the prurient."26
The sense of shock at the mere mention of sex, together with the belief
that those who flouted conventional standards of sexual morality or used
sex for commercial gain were degenerates and perverts, were essential to
the law's efforts to repress sexual freedom during the 1920s and 1930s.
The language quoted in the preceding paragraphs makes it clear that
judges during the two decades in question had no empathy for anyone
who violated conventional sexual taboos; the judges believed the behavior
of such people to be so different from their own that they had no diffi-
culty condemning violators as members of an evil, lower class worthy of
imprisonment. Few doubted the ultimate good and verity of the conven-
20. Ibid., 434.
21. 16 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Jefferson County Ct. 1939).
22. Ibid., 329-30.
23. 234 N.Y. 1.
24. Ibid., 12.




Nelson: Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920-1980
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1993
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
tional standards, and thus the desirability of protecting the public from
anyone in the lower class who might undermine them.
One important mechanism for so protecting the public was movie cen-
sorship. No movie could be shown in New York until it received a
license from the Motion Picture Division of the Board of Regents, and
whenever licenses were denied to movies which emphasized the carnal
side of the sex relationship, the denials typically would be judicially
affirmed.27 Thus, a license was denied to a picture that portrayed "the
nervous, emotional and mental state of the wife arising because of the
impotence of the husband, and the consequent unbalanced moral charac-
ter and indiscretions of the wife," on the ground that such a movie was
"immoral" and would "tend to corrupt morals."28
Even motion pictures with an arguably educational or polemical con-
tent were sometimes subjected to the repression of the censor. One such
picture was "The Naked Truth," which traced the lives of three individu-
als from boyhood to manhood, portrayed the dangers and results of
"association with lewd women," and showed a male and female in the
nude, along with the progress of different venereal diseases and the effects
thereof.29 An even clearer case occurred with the censorship of
"Tomorrow's Children," described in a dissenting opinion as a forceful
and dramatic argument against the enactment of statutes which, under
certain circumstances, permitted forced operations to prevent procrea-
tion.30 The movie portrayed, among other things, a "poverty stricken
feeble-minded family" submitting to sterilization in exchange for help, a
young woman sentenced to the operation being released only on the sud-
den discovery that "there was no law permitting the mutilation of her
body against her will," and a judge "discharging a frenzied, moronic,
sexual pervert, upon the intervention of a 'Senator' exerting political
influence on the court." On these facts, the censors and the majority of
the reviewing court found that the "reproductive organs are the theme
and their perversion is the topic of the picture"; the majority concluded
that "Tomorrow's Children" was "devoted to an illegal practice, which
is ... immoral and reprehensible according to the standards of a very
large part of the citizenry of the state."' a3
Efforts to censor theatrical performances also occurred and generally
met with success. Although the license of a theater could not be revoked
for performing a play which the Commissioner of Licenses found
27. Eureka Productions v. Byrne, 300 N.Y.S. 218 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1937), leave to appeal
denied, 276 N.Y. 688 (1938).
28. Mayer v. Byrne, 10 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1939). For a later case
sustaining censorship of a book that told the same story, see People on Complaint of Sumner v. Dial
Press, 48 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Magis. Ct. Richmond County 1944).
29. Public Welfare Pictures Corp. v. Lord, 230 N.Y.S. 137 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1928).
30. Foy Productions v. Graves, 3 N.Y.S.2d 573, 578 (App. Div. 3d Dep't), affd, 278 N.Y. 498
(1938).
31. Ibid., 574-75, 577.
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improper,32 the Commissioner could refuse to renew the theater's
license.33 The theater could also be subjected to criminal prosecution.34
The courts did "not propose to sanction indecency on the stage," to let
down "the bars against immoral shows,"' 35 or to sanction nudity or other
performances "calculated to exploit the excitation of lustful and lecher-
ous desires."
36
Books were likewise subject to censorship throughout the 1920s and
1930s, although occasional breaks occurred in the otherwise solid wall of
repression. The most important break took place in the 1934 case of
United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce.37 Augustus
Hand, joined by his cousin Learned Hand, held that, with literature as
with science, a book could not be judged obscene "where the presenta-
tion, when viewed objectively, is sincere, and the erotic matter ... does
not furnish the dominant note of the publication. ' 3  Any other test,
Hand argued, "would exclude much of the great works of literature" and
prove "stiffing to [artistic] progress."39 Nonetheless censorship remained
the dominant approach to pornographic publications. As Judge Manton,
who dissented in the Ulysses case, wrote:
[S]tatute[s] against obscenity [exist] for the protection of the great
mass of our people .... [L]iterature exists for the sake of the people,
to refresh the weary, to console the sad, to hearten the dull and
downcast, to increase man's interest in the world, his joy of living,
and his sympathy in all sorts and conditions of men. Art for art's
sake is heartless.... The people need and deserve a moral standard;
it should be a point of honor with men of letters to maintain it.
Masterpieces have never been produced by men given to obscenity
or lustful thoughts .... A refusal to imitate obscenity or to load a
book with it is an author's professional chastity.4
Other judges agreed, observing that the "Code of Morality or Decency
... is as old as the World itself and does not change" and that it "would
sanction the destruction of all law to give to individuals.., the privilege
of having their violations of the law adjudged by standards made by
themselves and labelled 'our time.' ,4 Accordingly, the Appellate Divi-
32. See A.H. Woods Theatre Co. v. Gilchrist, 192 N.Y.S. 417, reargument denied, 192 N.Y.S.
421 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), affid, 233 N.Y. 616 (1922).
33. See Bonserk Theatre Corp. v. Moss, 34 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942).
34. See People v. Wendling, 258 N.Y. 451 (1932).
35. Ibid., 455 (dictum).
36. Bonserk Theatre, 34 N.Y.S.2d 541, 548.
37. 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
38. Ibid., 707.
39. Ibid., 708. In People v. Miller, 279 N.Y.S. 583 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1935), another
judge allowed circulation of an allegedly obscene book on the ground that "the public concept of
decency has changed" and "the task of the judge is to record the tides of public opinion, not to
emulate King Canute in an effort to turn back the tide." Ibid., 584-85.
40. U.S. v. Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 711.
41. People ex reL Kahan v. Jaffe, 35 N.Y.S.2d 104, 106-07 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1942).
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sion refused to permit the sale of Hands Around, a book of short stories
that, as described by the court, commenced with a prostitute and ended
with a prostitute and consisted, according to the book's advertising, of
" 'psychological studies of the interplay of sex and keen analysis of the
sophisticated modern soul.'" On this description, the court found the
book "a lewd, lascivious, indecent, obscene and disgusting book."'4 2
Nothing, however, appears to have rankled judges of the 1920s and
1930s as much as nudity, which they viewed as a species of obscenity.
One Supreme Court Justice indicated his support for legislation designed
"to prevent the publication, distribution, and sale of lascivious or obscene
prints and publications, the tendency of which is to excite lustful desire,"
refusing to protect the copyright of a magazine containing "pictures of
girls clad with nothing but underwear and stockings" and stories with
"the general theme of sex and sex relations. ' 43 In another case, a court
found that a photograph of a woman reclining in the nude with the light-
ing effect so arranged that "the woman's busts and private parts were
brought into prominence" was "unquestionably ... a 'provocative pic-
ture.' "' Nudity, as one judge summed up the matter, could not "but
offend against all sense of public decency" since "the parading of persons
• . .naked, in public places, would raise thoughts of lasciviousness and
lust." 45
The extent to which discussion of sexual matters was repressed
emerges in especially sharp light in the case of People v. Swasey,46 which
involved the conviction of one George Swasey for advocating repeal of
the section of the Penal Law prohibiting the giving of information con-
cerning birth control. The reviewing court had no doubt that "[u]nder
certain circumstances and at certain times language may undoubtedly
amount to disorderly conduct," especially "where children are present"
and where "the nature of the subject-matter discussed and the impropri-
ety of discussing it in the presence of children" may cause mere speech
"to produce a breach of the peace."4 7 In the case at bar, the court
reversed the conviction of Swasey only because "the police officers placed
42. People v. Pesky, 243 N.Y.S. 193, 194-95 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), affid, 254 N.Y. 373 (1930).
Accord, People v. Spiegel, 222 N.Y.S. 614 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 246 N.Y.
638 (1927). For cases in which printed matter was found not obscene, see People v. Brainard, 183
N.Y.S. 452 (App. Div. Ist Dep't 1920) (prosecution of president of Harper & Bros. for unknown
book); People v. Larsen, 5 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Ct. Spec. Sess. Bronx County 1938) (magazine story on
childbirth); People v. Viking Press, 264 N.Y.S. 534 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1933) (prosecution of
publisher of Erskine Caldwell's book God's Little Acre).
43. Ultem Publications, 2 N.Y.S.2d 933, 934-36.
44. People v. Smith, 300 N.Y.S. 651, 652 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1937), quoting People v.
Fellerman, 276 N.Y.S. 198, 199 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1934). Accord Freedman v. New York Soc'y
for Suppression of Vice, 290 N.Y.S. 753 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1936), afl'd, 274 N.Y. 559 (1937);
People v. Fellerman, 276 N.Y.S. 198 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1934), affid, 269 N.Y. 629 (1936).
45. People v. Burke, 276 N.Y.S. 402, 411-12 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1934) (dissenting opinion),
aff'd, 267 N.Y. 571 (1935).
46. 180 N.Y.S. 629 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1920).
47. Ibid., 630-31.
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a mistaken interpretation upon the language used by the defendant, ...
did not accurately report it, ... [and] clearly did not understand" it.4" In
other cases where the police did their work properly, however, the courts
sustained convictions of defendants who, for example, distributed adver-
tisements about cures for venereal disease' or engaged in lewd
dancing. 50
Efforts to protect public decency even trod occasionally upon core
political speech. In People v. Baylinson,5' for example, the defendant,
who was secretary of the Society of Independent Artists, was convicted
of outraging public decency for displaying at an exhibition at the Wal-
dorf-Astoria Hotel a painting of the scene at the wedding feast at Cana,
where Christ is said to have turned water into wine. The painting also
showed "the likeness of ex-Congressman Volstead," standing "with his
right hand upon the Saviour's shoulder, his left directing attention to the
vessels of wine, one of which lies broken upon the floor," while "the
contents of another [were] being spilled out by William Jennings Bryan."
Although the Appellate Division found the painting in "bad taste" and
"sacrilegious," it nevertheless reversed Baylinson's conviction because
there was no "proof that public decency was [actually] outraged" or that
Baylinson had any power to prevent the picture from being displayed. 2
Another instance of repression of ideas occurred when a trial judge
annulled the appointment of the eminent British philosopher, Bertrand
Russell, as a professor of philosophy at the City College of New York,
because of Russell's "notorious immoral and salacious teachings" and his
consequent lack of "good moral character."5 " The immorality charged
was that Russell, in his books, saw no harm in masturbation, homosexu-
ality, adultery, or, indeed, in any private sexual activity that did not
result in the birth of children, even when college students engaged in the
activity.54 The trial judge's opinion, which had been entered in a tax-
payer's suit against the College's governing board, became final when the
City Corporation's Counsel, at the behest of Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia,
refused to appeal it,5 5 and the appellate courts refused to allow independ-
ent counsel to intervene on behalf of either Russell56 or the College."
The other subject of intense criminal regulation during the 1920s and
48. Ibid., 630.
49. See People v. Morris, 18 N.Y.S.2d 448 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1940).
50. See People v. Vickers, 19 N.Y.S.2d 165 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1940).
51. 206 N.Y.S. 804 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1924).
52. Ibid., 806-08.
53. Kay v. Board of Higher Educ. of N.Y., 18 N.Y.S.2d 821, 826 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940).
54. Ibid., 827-31.
55. See Horace M. Kallen, "Behind the Bertrand Russell Case," in The Bertrand Russell Case,
ed. John Dewey and Horace M. Kallen (New York: Viking Press, 1941), 13, 22-23.
56. See Kay v. Board of Higher Educ. of N.Y., 20 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), leave to
appeal denied, 21 N.Y.S.2d 396 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 284 N.Y. 578 (1940).
57. See Kay v. Board of Higher Educ. of N.Y., 20 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), leave to
appeal denied, 23 N.Y.S.2d 479, 24 N.Y.S.2d 986, and 25 N.Y.S.2d 792 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1940).
1993]
11
Nelson: Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920-1980
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1993
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
1930s, along with film and book censorship, was prostitution. Many of
the prostitution cases dealt with technical questions,"8 but others raised
more trenchant issues. People v. Anonymous,59 for example, held directly
that a male customer of a prostitute could not be found guilty of the
crime of prostitution. But this view did not prevail easily. The judge
who reached it did "not argue that this attitude was just or fair" toward
women, and he also recognized that "in the interest of the public health,
it would have been wiser to bring the male participant... under some
sort of governmental supervision."' And another judge held that arrest-
ing prostitutes while freeing their customers amounted to "an unjust dis-
crimination" that could no "longer be permitted to continue." In this
judge's view, "[m]en caught with women in an act of prostitution are
equally guilty, and should be arrested and held for trial with the
women."6 The question whether to arrest male customers was resolved
only when the legislature refused to pass a bill mandating such arrests.62
The need to prosecute customers in order to eliminate prostitutes nev-
ertheless seemed obvious, given the fact that prostitution was "a system"
through which men "by the use of money and other valuable considera-
tions" become "enabled to largely coerce and control the will of unfortu-
nate women" and thereby to "dominate" those women.63 Indeed, judges
of the 1920s and 1930s could become quite emotional in cases such as
People v. Kramer," in which a man fraudulently told women that he was
a representative of a major motion picture house and offered to secure for
them "lucrative employment in moving pictures." Although the defend-
ant planned "to gratuitously gratify his lust with them" as "an incident
in his general scheme" for exploiting the women, his "basic purpose was
to deliver the unfortunate[s] ... to prostitution." In the court's incensed
view, a "meaner or viler form of debauching persons seeking employ-
ment [was] hard to imagine."65
In view of concerns such as these for protecting women and preserving
58. Such as the sufficiency of the evidence that the defendant had prostituted herself: compare
People v. Lorraine, 196 N.Y.S. 323 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1922), with People v. Wachtel, 244 N.Y.S.
462 (App. Part 1st Dep't 1930); that the defendant had procured a woman for prostitution: see
People v. Silverman, 245 N.Y.S. 568 (App. Part 1st Dep't 1930), affid, 258 N.Y.S. 1049 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1932); or that the defendant's premises had knowingly been used for the purpose of
prostitution: compare People v. Royall, 281 N.Y.S. 875 (App. Part 2d Dep't 1935), and People v.
Smith, 207 N.Y.S. 555 (App. Part 1st Dep't 1924), with People v. Webb, 26 N.Y.S.2d 386 (App.
Part 1st Dep't 1941), and People v. Botto, 237 N.Y.S. 513 (App. Part 1st Dep't 1929).
59. 292 N.Y.S. 282 (Magis. Ct. Kings County 1936).
60. Ibid., 286.
61. People v. Edwards, 180 N.Y.S. 631, 635 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1920).
62. See Mackey, Hammer at Vice.
63. People v. Odierno, 2 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102-03 (Queens County Ct. 1938). Accord, People v.
Guardino, 30 N.Y.S.2d 729, 732 (Kings County Ct. 1941), affid, 37 N.Y.S.2d 981 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1942), affd, 290 N.Y. 749 (1943). On the conditions of inequality that induced many women
to choose lives of prostitution, see Ruth Rosen, The Lost Sisterhood: Prostitution in America, 1900-
1918 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 137-68.
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high moral standards, it is necessary to ask why most judges and legisla-
tors were unwilling to allow men who consumed the services of prosti-
tutes to be prosecuted criminally. The reason, I suspect, was that
criminal prosecution of a customer entailed "class[ifying] an otherwise
respectable man with those 'who are vagrants.' "66 Elite male judges
found it better to permit upper-class men to dominate, control, and ulti-
mately coerce lower-class women for purposes of sexual gratification
than to subject their "erring brothers" to criminal liability and "black-
mail" and thereby place them "at the mercy" of "those conscienceless
vampires who make merchandise of the passions of men ."67 The same
elite judges would recoil a few years later, however, when the class tables
were turned and "CCC camp boys"-"an element of young men who are
transients in the community"-tried to exploit a local "girl." 6
Analogous class biases also emerged in obscenity cases. Occasional
judges saw a need to bar the upper class from viewing obscenity on the
grounds that it would be wrong to allow "style, imagination, [and] learn-
ing" to "create a privileged class" and that "disgusting details... served
up in a polished style" were "all the more dangerous and insidious."69
Most judges, however, believed that on special occasions members of the
upper class would need privileged access to sexually explicit information.
It seemed obvious, for instance, that "facts" which were "not proper sub-
ject matter" for a general audience needed to be discussed openly in "the
classroom of the law school, the medical school and clinic, the research
laboratory, the doctor's office, and even the theological school."7 And,
as the many cases discussed above7 clearly showed, the lower classes and
the young were most in need of protection. Only "positive measures" of
censoring obscene movies and publications could "protect the minds of
our growing boys and girls from this pestilence and noisome filth,"7" and
save the lower classes from lives of vice and crime.
II. THE JUDICIARY AND DECRIMINALIZATION
With the end of the 1930s and the coming of the 1940s, new attitudes
toward sexual immorality began to appear in judicial opinions, even
while old values remained deeply ensconced. As a result, the years of
World War II and those following it witnessed a sort of schizophrenia on
the part of the New York courts, as some judges became, in effect, lead-
66. People v. Anonymous, 292 N.Y.S. 282, 286.
67. Odierno, 2 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101, 103 (emphasis in original). The quoted language, which had its
origin in substance in People v. Draper, 154 N.Y.S. 1034, 1038 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1915), was also
used as late as People v. Jelke, 152 N.Y.S.2d 479, 483 (Ct. App. 1956).
68. People v. VanWhy, 32 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Chenango County Ct. 1941), rev'd on other grounds,
288 N.Y. 659 (1942).
69. Halsey, 234 N.Y. 1, 13-14 (dissenting opinion). See also Wendling, 258 N.Y. 451, 454.
70. Foy Productions, 3 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577.
71. See supra text at notes 14-15, 18-27, 40, and 47.
72. Ultem Publications, 2 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937.
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ers in an effort for the decriminalization of sex offenses, while others
remained their conservative opponents.
In all the areas under consideration in this article-homosexuality,
prostitution, gender-related violence, pornography, and even rape-the
liberal judges who supported decriminalization ceased to perceive a need
to keep up the "perennial struggle against all influences tending to cor-
rupt and incite to vice" so as to preserve "the reservoir of social life"
from becoming "poisoned" by "disorder and anarchy."' 73 At least on
some occasions, these liberals went even further and became supportive
of unrestrained male sexual freedom, probably without ever considering
its consequences for women and children. At other times, however,
other judges gave credence to more traditional values, observing that it
was their "obligation ... to protect weaker members of society from...
corrupt influences." 74 In particular, these conservative judges felt a spe-
cial need to protect "adolescents," who were "feeling the stress and
strain of life in a world tortured by doubts."75
The conflict between liberals seeking decriminalization and traditional-
ists who still supported criminal enforcement of conventional morality
began when new sorts of fact situations first appeared in reported cases
during the 1940s. Seven cases decided between 1940 and 1960, resulting
in two convictions and five acquittals, will illustrate. In one of the two
cases involving only adults, Walden P. Stevens lured Anna Mae Faulk-
ner away from her home and two minor children and spent the night
with her in his car "contrary to law."'7 6 In the other case of an adult,
Hazel Prudhomme pleaded guilty to "being in a parked car having
improper relations with a man not her husband, she being a married
woman."
77
Two cases involved minors in their late teens. In one, the defendant
used "a vulgar expression" in talking to a 17-year-old boy in the presence
of a girl of the same age, with whom the boy had been keeping steady
company for seven months and to whom he was unofficially engaged; the
defendant "told the boy 'lay her as there are precautions you can take,'
and 'go to bed together because there are precautions.' ",78 In the other,
an adult male sent a letter to a 16-year-old boy saying, " 'I'll give you
$5.00 or more if you let me' (engage with you in an act best defined as
pederasty--ed.)." The boy's mother intercepted the letter and brought it
to the attention of the authorities.79
73. Bonserk Theatre, 34 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545-46.
74. People on Complaint of Arcuri v. Finkelstein, 114 N.Y.S.2d 810, 813 (Magis. Ct. Kings
County 1952).
75. People v. Eagle, 117 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (Magis. Ct. Queens County 1952).
76. People v. Stevens, 74 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347 (Columbia County Ct. 1947) (conviction set aside).
77. People ex rel. Prudhomme v. Superintendent of New York State Reformatory for Women,
21 N.Y.S.2d 563, 565 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1940) (conviction set aside).
78. People v. Reese, 212 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1960) (information dismissed).
79. People v. Radaha, 69 N.Y.S.2d 722, 724 (Rockland County Ct.), rev'd sub no. People ex
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The other three cases involved younger children or children of
unknown age. In the first, a set of pictures constituting "a strip tease
series" was on sale in a small neighborhood store serving the families of
the area, where high school students could "come in, observe these pic-
tures, purchase them and seek dark corners and privacy to snicker over
its [sic] contents and pass the pictures around among their friends."80 In
the second, the defendant, a man of "good reputation," was charged with
asking two girls under twelve " 'to commit an unnatural act with him.' "
He admitted asking directions of the girls and produced a witness who
testified that he overheard the conversation with the girls and heard no
improper request. The prosecutor, in turn, produced two other girls who
testified that, although they observed the first two girls talking to the
defendant, they never saw the alleged witness."' In the final case, where
a "sharp question of fact [was] presented," the defendant was accused of
exposing his private parts before a child of unknown age. 2
Why did cases such as these first begin to be published in the New
York reports during the 1940s? Surely conduct of the sort involved had
occurred earlier, and some individuals had undoubtedly been arrested
and prosecuted for engaging in it. But, if they had interposed defenses
instead of merely pleading guilty, their arguments had not risen to a level
that called for a published opinion in response. Beginning in the 1940s,
however, at least some judges felt a need to write and publish opinions
because, I believe, they ceased to understand the conduct of the defend-
ants as seriously criminal or exploitative of women or children. Instead,
I sense that these judges viewed most of the cases as involving, at worst,
what Michel Foucault has labelled "inconsequential bucolic pleasures"-
terminology he chose to describe an incident in which a French farm-
hand exposed himself before "a little girl" and "obtained a few caresses"
from her, ending in "the familiar game called 'curdled milk.' "83
Much the same pattern, in which some judges overlooked sexual mis-
conduct as trivial even while others still wanted to punish it as seriously
criminal, emerges from examination of the reported New York cases dur-
ing the quarter century after World War II dealing with specific areas of
the law, such as sodomy, prostitution, family violence, pornography, and
even rape. Most of the cases involved commercialized vice, consensual
sexual activity, or violence within families-matters in which judges and
legislators increasingly came to believe that the criminal law ought not
interfere. Of course, some cases, especially those that charged rape, did
tel. Radaha v. Mock, 69 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1947) (conviction reversed)
(parenthetical in original).
80. Arcuri v. Finkelstein, 114 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812-13 (information sustained).
81. People v. Casey, 67 N.Y.S.2d 9, 11-12 (Utica City Ct. 1946) (conviction upheld).
82. People v. Reilly, 124 N.Y.S.2d 746 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1953) (conviction reversed).
83. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 31.
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involve violence between strangers. But even in these, as well as in cases
of nonviolence, judges increasingly hesitated to apply the criminal pro-
cess with rigor, out of concern not to ruin the lives of men who, perhaps
through circumstances beyond their control, had made what judges char-
acterized as a single, stupid mistake. Comparable concern for the well-
being of female and child victims, on the other hand, or even an aware-
ness that much sexual conduct could involve victimization, was not a
hallmark of sex crime jurisprudence as it moved into the 1960s. For by
that decade, the trend toward decriminalization had become dominant.
A. Sodomy
Much of the argument for and against decriminalization of sex
offenses, both in learned journals and in the popular press, was addressed
specifically to the crime of consensual sodomy. Here the argument for
decriminalization was perhaps at its strongest. As one scholar, Edwin
M. Schur, explained:
Laws against homosexual acts do not significantly control the
proscribed behavior. The extremely low visibility under which the
acts may occur, the lack of a complainant, and the ambiguous
nature of public support combine to make these laws highly unen-
forceable .... The most evident results of antihomosexuality laws
are . . . the encouragement of police corruption and repressive
enforcement procedures.... [L]aw enforcement officials fall back on
an amalgam of unsavory vice-squad . . . [and] spy techniques...
abhorrent to the democratic way of life.... These laws, in short,
make a good many individuals more unhappy than they would
otherwise be, without showing any short-run signs of effectively
dealing with the problem of homosexuality.8 4
Arguments such as this had a profound effect on the New York Court
of Appeals. At a time when most institutions, especially those of the
federal government, were aggressively engaged in oppression of homo-
sexuals,"5 the New York Court of Appeals took initial steps in the direc-
tion of decriminalization. Beginning with People v. Doyle,86 a 1952
decision that placed procedural obstacles in the path of sodomy prosecu-
tions, the majority of the judges on the Court of Appeals took a series of
steps tending to decriminalize consensual homosexual acts carried on in
private.
Doyle reaffirmed the existence of an enormous practical obstacle in the
84. Edwin M. Schur, Crimes Without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public Policy: Abortion,
Homosexuality, Drug Addiction (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 79-80, 114. On
enforcement of the laws against homosexuality, see Jon J. Gallo, et al., Note, "The Consenting Adult
Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles
County," U.CLA. Law Review 13 (1966): 647, 686-792.
85. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 40-53.
86. 304 N.Y. 120 (1952).
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path of prosecuting homosexuals for private, consensual conduct. In
Doyle, a majority of the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a
defendant who had taught in schools for boys for 25 years for an act of
sodomy with one of his 12-year-old students. Finding insufficient evi-
dence that the boy had been forced to participate against his will, the
court in what Judge Desmond in dissent labelled a "shocking conclu-
sion" 7 deemed him an accomplice, held that a man could not be con-
victed of a consensual homosexual act without evidence to corroborate
an accomplice's testimony, and held that the corroborating evidence in
this case, consisting of the defendant's admission to the police "'that he
was fooling with the boy,' "88 was insufficient. Although the court
implied that a victim of forcible sodomy could by himself provide the
evidence needed for conviction, the effect of its evidentiary ruling was to
render nearly impossible the prosecution of consensual homosexual acts
committed in private.
It is not obvious at what the Court of Appeals was aiming in the Doyle
case. The case did not make new law; the rule requiring corroboration of
accomplice testimony in sodomy cases went back to People v. Desches-
sere,89 in which "a youth of 17 years of age, who ... was an imbecile"
had testified to what "his father had told him. . . to say" and then on
cross-examination had declared "that the story he told was not true." 90
The rule originating in Deschessere and reiterated in Doyle had been
applied uniformly in a series of Appellate Division cases in the decade
prior to Doyle,91 and the jury in Doyle had been instructed in accordance
with the rule. Perhaps the court was usurping the Appellate Division's
function of passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence,92 or perhaps it
was convinced that some injustice had been done. But it is difficult to see
why the court would have chosen a case in which a 49-year-old teacher
was charged with sodomy on a 12-year-old boy to make a point about
evidentiary sufficiency or injustice.
It seems most likely that the objective of the court was to signal its
unwillingness to allow use of the state's criminal process in an otherwise
emerging, national pattern of oppression of homosexuals. 93 The court
87. Ibid., 123.
88. Ibid., 123-24 (dissenting opinion).
89. 74 N.Y.S. 761 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1902).
90. Ibid., 762.
91. See People v. LaCasse, 42 N.Y.S.2d 730 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1943); People v. Petrucci, 67
N.Y.S.2d 611 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1947); People v. Crocker, 74 N.Y.S.2d 593 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1947).
92. Passing upon the sufficiency of evidence of compulsion or consent was a function regularly
performed by both the Appellate Division and triers of fact. For examples involving the Appellate
Division, see People v. Dalrymple, 112 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1952); People v. Link,
157 N.Y.S.2d 988 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1956), afid, 168 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1957). For an
example involving a trier of fact, see People v. Portolano, 223 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Queens County Ct.
1962).
93. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 40-52.
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could not use the favored concept of the 1980s-the constitutional right
to privacy-to achieve that result, since the United States Supreme Court
had not yet set down the building blocks, in Griswold v. Connecticut94
and subsequent cases, from which to construct such a right. Instead, it
had to rely on the tools that were available to it-namely, rules of juris-
diction, procedure, and evidence that could be manipulated to make
prosecution difficult or, in cases of private, consensual homosexuality,
virtually impossible. As we shall see, the New York courts during the
1950s and 1960s relied on such rules in a wide variety of contexts, at least
as often as later courts would turn to the right of privacy.
The Court of Appeals's next attempt at reform occurred in People v.
Randall," in which a 59-year-old defendant had been convicted of sod-
omy for requesting and then voluntarily permitting a 16-year-old to per-
form an act of anal intercourse on him. One ground of the defendant's
appeal was that the police had beaten him and caused his ear canal to
bleed in order to extract a confession from him, and perhaps this claim
elucidated sympathy from the court. The court did not, however, reverse
the conviction on this ground, but chose instead to avoid the constitu-
tional issue and deal with the case by giving a cramped reading to the
sodomy statute. Noting that, prior to 1950, New York law had declared
that anyone who "'carnally knows any male or female person by the
anus or by or with the mouth; or voluntarily submits to such carnal
knowledge' . . . is guilty of sodomy" and that "[a]bruptly" in 1950 the
"statute was revised" to omit any reference to the person who " 'volunta-
rily submits to such carnal knowledge,' "96 the court held unanimously
that only a man who inserted his penis into the anus of another could be
guilty of sodomy; the other person could at most be guilty as an
accomplice.
Although one cannot be certain, it may be that old-fashioned issues of
class motivated the court in Randall, as well as other courts, to "emascu-
late.., the statute" '97 prohibiting consensual sodomy. The court merely
noted in Randall that the defendant, who lived on a small family farm,
had no prior record at the time of his arrest, while the 16-year-old had
been picked up by the State Police for questioning in connection with the
whereabouts of a boy who was wanted by probation authorities.98 An
earlier court, in contrast, had been far more explicit when it described
one sodomy defendant as "a man of education and culture, with a distin-
guished war record," while the "boy" with whom he had committed the
offense "was unquestionably of low grade mentality" which, when "cou-
94. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
95. 214 N.Y.S.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1961).
96. Ibid., 421-22, quoting statutory language (emphasis in original).
97. People v. Maggio, 228 N.Y.S.2d 791, 794 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1962) (dissenting opinion),
rev'd, 235 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Ct. App. 1962).
98. See Randall, 214 N.Y.S.2d 417, 419.
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pled with his vagrant habits, would not indicate a normal degree of
responsibility." 99 When a defendant was "charged with a serious and
repulsive crime" such as sodomy, he "should not be found guilty without
clear and reliable testimony";" "it shock[ed] one's sense of justice that a
person should be convicted, and should serve a long term in prison, upon
testimony" of "this half-witted youth."101 For these judges, it seems
that, even if the weak and the poor were not exactly legitimate prey for
the lusts of men of culture and education, such men at least ought not
have their lives ruined by a blunder, the occurrence of which was evi-
denced by uncertain testimony.
The effect of these decisions was to make homosexual acts carried on
in private difficult to prosecute. As long as both men consented to an act,
the rule against convictions based on accomplice testimony prohibited
either from testifying against the other. Conviction could be had only on
the testimony of some third party observer; that is, conviction could be
had only if a consensual act had not been truly private. Not even the
most common type of nonconsensual sodomy-acts by older men on
youths unable by virtue of age or mental infirmity to give their consent-
could be readily prosecuted in view of the hesitancy of courts in the
1950s to rely on the testimony of boys to convict men of stature and
standing. Thus, while homosexuality did not gain formal legal legiti-
macy in the decades after World War II, men wishing to engage in pri-
vate homosexual activity could, in practice, do so with reduced fear of
the criminal law.
B. Prostitution
The law regulating prostitution was a second area in which a
decriminalization trend occurred.' 02 The argument for decriminalization
was essentially the same as the argument for consensual homosexuality.
It was expressed eloquently by Herbert L. Packer:
There seems little reason to believe that the incidence of prostitu-
tion has been seriously reduced by criminal law enforcement....
The side effects on law enforcement are unfortunate. Police corrup-
tion is closely associated with this kind of vice control. . . .An
equally disgusting kind of enforcement practice is the use of the
police or police-employed decoy to detect solicitation. . . .What
does society gain from this kind of law enforcement activity? If the
effort is to stamp out prostitution, it is plainly doomed to failure. If
99. Crocker, 74 N.Y.S.2d 593.
100. Dalrymple, 112 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (involving sodomy on a young woman of 14).
101. Deschessere, 74 N.Y.S. 761, 762, 764.
102. Of course, much old doctrine endured, such as doctrine defining an accomplice whose
testimony would not provide sufficient corroboration for a conviction, see Guardino, 30 N.Y.S.2d
729; or doctrine dealing with the sufficiency of evidence, see People v. Lynn, 307 N.Y. 683 (1954),
and People v. Santiago, 79 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1948).
19931
19
Nelson: Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920-1980
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1993
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
it is to eradicate or curb the spread of venereal disease, that too is
illusory. . . .To put it crudely but accurately, the law is per-
verted .... It seems that prostitution, like obscenity and like other
sexual offenses, should be viewed as a nuisance offense whose grava-
men is not the act itself, or even the accompanying commercial
transaction, but rather its status as a public indecency.10 3
The earliest case set in the new midcentury culture of decriminaliza-
tion was People ex rel. Colletti v. Morehead.""° Colletti was remarkably
similar to the earlier Kramer case, in which a man had tried to entice a
woman into prostitution by offers of employment in the movie industry.
What made Colletti different was that the court found it prudent to take
note of how the defendant had become involved with two 16-year-old
women who had hitchhiked from their homes in Lancaster, Penn-
sylvania, first to Harrisburg and then to Long Island City, in March of
1944. They had been delivered by their driver to a restaurant in which
the defendant worked. After giving them free food and offering to help
them get work, possibly "in a defense" industry, the defendant intro-
duced them to one Rubenstein, who made offers of an apartment, furs,
clothing and support to one of the women " 'if she would be nice to
him'" and have "no visitors." Rubenstein kept the defendant informed
of "his negotiations," and when he asked the defendant for his approval,
the defendant gave it with a nod and with the word" 'yes.'" Rubenstein
thereupon obtained a hotel room for the woman where, it was charged,
"he committed an immoral act" with her.'0 5
The court held that, as a matter of law, these facts did not constitute
sufficient evidence to warrant holding the defendant for trial on charges
of enticing a woman into prostitution. In its view, this exploitation of a
16-year-old woman amounted to nothing more than an "incidental con-
cession ... to lasciviousness." Prostitution, in contrast, involved "a per-
manent condition" that required "'common, indiscriminate,
meretricious commerce with men.' "'06 It is difficult, though, to appreci-
ate the court's reading of the facts. At the very least, Colletti was a case
in which one man, Colletti, assisted another, Rubenstein, in buying sex-
ual favors. If the case had been allowed to go to trial, facts might have
emerged at trial showing that Colletti anticipated Rubenstein to be
merely the first customer. The Colletti case manifests too many aspects
of sexual exploitation and is best understood as one in which the court,
consistent with cultural norms beginning to emerge during World War
103. Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1968), 328-31.
104. 50 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1944).
105. Ibid., 79.
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I1,107 found what a later court would call "'recreational sex' "108 an
appropriate reward for hardworking men who, because of rationing, had
few other ways to spend the money that their contribution to the war
effort had brought. This was especially so when the women providing
the recreation had seemed to display their willingness to do so by
uprooting themselves from protective homes in a moral community of
middle America and hitchhiking to one of the main domestic centers of
the war. The court's mindset blinded it to certain small facts of the case,
which in the aggregate suggest that the defendant, "behind the mask of a
legal-looking business, lure[d] innocent young girls into a respectable-
appearing" restaurant "and there ... procure[d] them for unlawful sex-
ual intercourse."' 109
Three decisions by the Court of Appeals during the 1950s displayed a
similar judicial mindset. The decisions, one taken with the support of an
amicus brief from the ACLU, can all be interpreted as upholding the
civil liberties of higher-class call girls and the men involved with them.
Viewed from another perspective, however, the three decisions deprived
the police of their main weapons for putting call girls out of business, and
"undoubtedly hamper[ed] ... law enforcement officers in their continued
attempts to control th[e] social evil. '" 1 0 By declining to pass on signifi-
cant constitutional issues and, in the alternative, construing statutes nar-
rowly and holding evidence insufficient to sustain convictions, the Court
of Appeals made it difficult to prosecute and thus to a significant degree
decriminalized prostitution that was conducted in a discrete fashion.
People v. GoulI reversed the conviction of a man admitted to the bar
but engaged in the jewelry business. He had telephoned a policewoman
working undercover who had placed an advertisement in a large New
York daily seeking employment as a bookkeeper. After offering her a job
as a salesperson, he had told her that she could earn a much higher
income if she would have affairs with his customers. During a personal
interview, he offered to set her up in an apartment, pay her $50 per week,
and arrange to send her at least four men daily whom she could charge
$10 each for acts of sexual intercourse. He also inquired whether she
engaged in "two forms of abnormal sexual activity." 1 2
107. See infra text at notes 312-31 for a discussion of the emergence of new attitudes during the
war.
108. People v. Costello, 395 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
109. People v. Catalano, 205 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1960). In Catalano,
the defendant ran an employment agency where "the only employment which the defendant offered
these girls (two of whom were seventeen) were jobs for which they would have to submit to unlawful
sexual intercourse, or other lewd acts, etc., with their employers." Ibid., 620. On those facts,
defendant was found guilty of violating the same statute which the Colletti defendant was acquitted
of violating.
110. People v. Choremi, 301 N.Y. 417, 421 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
111. 306 N.Y. 352 (1954).
112. Ibid., 355 (dissenting opinion).
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The court concluded that the defendant had done nothing more than
"suggest to a woman of good character, that she become a prostitute
under his management, and she, of course, rejected the proposal at
once." Noting that "very seldom in our criminal law .. . [does] a
rejected suggestion of wrongdoing amount ... to a substantive crime or
offense," the majority concluded that the defendant had not violated the
statute, which prohibited mere suggestions or, in its own language,
"offers to secure the services of another for the purpose of prostitu-
tion."' 13 By its headstrong misreading of the statute, a misreading which
required undercover officers actually to engage in wrongdoing in order to
obtain prostitution convictions, the majority effectively prevented their
use.
The liberal majority had similarly pursued a policy of substantially
decriminalizing call-girl type prostitution in People v. Choremi. 114 There,
telephone conversations intercepted by the police under a court order,
together with the defendant's own voluntary statements, showed that she
had made dates on one night with men who were " 'very nice' and
"'for twice what... [she] expect[ed].' " On another occasion, her code-
fendant, also a woman, arranged a date for her with a man who "'had
not been laid in a month, and so you can get paid and can enjoy yourself
at the same time.'" On still another occasion, when the defendant had
refused to meet another man because the money was insufficient, her
codefendant replied that " 'you can't meet fellows like we had yesterday
every day. They were exceptional and you can't always get that
money.' "115
On these facts, which it characterized as only "[s]uspicion and
surmise," the majority of the Court of Appeals found no "evidence of a
purpose to induce, entice, or procure another to commit an act of sexual
intercourse" and "not the slightest bit of evidence" that the defendant
had engaged in prostitution. With the support of an amicus brief from
the ACLU, the court found the evidence too "thin and meager" to sup-
port a conviction, apparently demanding what could never be obtained
by wiretapping-personal observations by police of the prostitutes and
their customers "in compromising positions" in "bedrooms where the
lights went off shortly after their entry."1"16
Relying on the court's recent unanimous decision in People v. Feiner"7
as authority for a broad reading of the vagrancy statute, including its
provision making prostitution a crime, the dissenters accused the major-
ity of an unduly narrow construction of the act. The majority's decision,
113. Ibid., 354.
114. 301 N.Y. 417.
115. Ibid., 423 (dissenting opinion).
116. Ibid., 419-20.
117. 300 N.Y. 391 (1950), aff'd, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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according to the dissent, thwarted the will of the legislature, put individ-
uals who had committed a recognized crime "beyond the reach of the
law," and made it impossible "to forbid persons from making themselves
available for unlawful sexual intercourse." The majority's holding, it was
said, produced an "incongruous" result, whereby a woman who solicited
on a street comer could be convicted of prostitution, but a female who
held herself forth in her home over the telephone was rendered immune
from punishment. 18
The third case, People v. Moss," 9 must be understood against the back-
drop of a key fact about the law of prostitution: its ambiguity. It is rela-
tively easy to know that an act of prostitution has occurred when a
conspicuous streetwalker offers to engage in sex with a man in return for
money and subsequently engages in sex and receives the money. New
York legislation in effect at the time of Moss defined prostitution broadly
to include not only acts of women providing sex for money but also activ-
ities of men inducing women to lead lives of prostitution or to commit
acts of prostitution or other lewd or indecent acts. This legislation, as
Judge VanVoorhis noted for the Court of Appeals in People v. Jelke,"2 °
was " 'obviously a patchwork affair' " that contained " 'botchy and
immaterial provisions' "; the "problem[s] in analyzing" the cases above
"stem[med] in considerable part from the draftsmanship" of the New
York statutes. 121 As applied to People v. Moss, which involved a "house-
keeper" who "was a willing participant" in acts of "sexual intercourse
and other lewd and indecent acts" with the defendant, her employer,
until she "became 'afraid of him,' ",122 the statutory law seemed utterly
lacking in precision and rigor.
Many judges found such conduct "reprehensible," 1 2 ' but they also
knew that prostitution convictions "may often be attended with the grav-
est consequences." It followed that, "if there is to be proper security of
personal liberty,"'124 criminal statutes had to be strictly construed and
that, "[i]f the Legislature chooses to make.., privately committed [sex]
acts.., a public offense or a crime, under whatever name, it should do so
expressly."1
25
From Moss it was easy for lawyers to take the next step and argue that
"a 'sexual revolution'" had occurred "in the past few decades" that had
118. Choremi, 301 N.Y. 417, 421-22.
119. 309 N.Y. 429 (1956).
120. 152 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Ct. App. 1956).
121. Ibid., 483, quoting People v. Draper, 154 N.Y.S. 1034, 1041 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1915).
122. 309 N.Y. 429, 431.
123. Ibid., 432.
124. People on Complaint of Harrington v. Marcial, 110 N.Y.S.2d 361, 364 (Magis. Ct. N.Y.
County 1952).
125. Moss, 309 N.Y. 429, 433. See also People v. Loocerello, 233 N.Y.S.2d 206, 224 (Onondaga
County Ct. 1962), rev'd, 239 N.Y.S.2d 283 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1963), which insisted that "no
lesser standards should be required" in "a criminal prosecution."
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legitimated "sex for pleasure, [or] 'recreational sex' "and had recognized
that "[n]on-married individuals have a right to pursue sex drives even if
they have to pay for it." On this basis, it could be urged that society
could "not legislate morality" and that, as "'older legislators and judges
...raised in repressive sexual adaptations [were] replaced by younger
men whose sexual adaptation'" emerged out of" 'the more recent social
mores of American society,'" the law would" 'be brought into line.' "t126
One judge, at least, accepted such arguments and declared that,
"[h]owever offensive it may be, recreational commercial sex threatens no
harm to the public health, safety or welfare" and thus should "not be
proscribed."' 127
The approach of most judges to prostitution in the 1950s and 1960s,
and even into the 1970s, was thus parallel to their approach to consen-
sual homosexuality. By construing legislation narrowly and holding evi-
dence of guilt insufficient to sustain convictions, a majority of judges, in
effect, pursued a policy of decriminalization. In doing so, moreover, they
expressed a concern in cases like Moss for protecting the personal liberty
of men, 2 ' while failing to appreciate how wealthy men could engage in
sexual exploitation of less privileged women. The court in Moss, for
example, could see only that "a young woman intelligent enough to have
been graduated from high school at the age of seventeen... participated
in sexual relations with the defendant voluntarily"-that two intelligent
individuals had "voluntarily"'' 29 entered a relationship which had turned
sour and had come to the attention of the criminal courts only when, as
the Court of Appeals observed five months later in another case, the
woman "found herself rejected" and "became vindictive."' 3 0 The court
thereupon construed the law so as "'not.. . to place the erring male at
the mercy of the erring female.' "a131 Of course, the effect of this con-
struction was to place women who were not in the least in error in per-
ceiving their economic necessity13 2 at the mercy of men who likewise did
not err in appreciating the sexual liberties they desired. But until the
1970s, the courts did not perceive this victimization.
C. Family Violence
The effort to decriminalize sex and gender-related offenses reached its
farthest extent when, in 1962, the legislature adopted Article 8 of the
Family Court Act, entitled Family Offenses Proceedings. Prior to 1962,
126. Costello, 395 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 (emphasis added).
127. In re P., 400 N.Y.S.2d 455, 468 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1977), rev'd, 418 N.Y.S.2d 597
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1979).
128. See Moss, 309 N.Y. 429, 432-33.
129. Ibid., 432.
130. Jelke, 152 N.Y.S.2d 479, 492.
131. Ibid., 484, quoting Odierno, 2 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103.
132. See Rosen, Lost Sisterhood, xvii.
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a family member who had been assaulted or otherwise victimized by
another member and desired judicial assistance was compelled to com-
mence a criminal action. 33 Article 8, in contrast, created a civil pro-
ceeding under the jurisdiction of the family court, which would attempt
to provide conciliation and treatment to alleviate the violence. As Linda
Gordon has shown, serious physical violence by men against women and
children has had a long history, 34 and by 1870 had been made a fit sub-
ject for criminal prosecution and severe criminal sentences in most
American jurisdictions. 35 In the attempt to decriminalize it, no one
advanced the argument that some had made in the effort to decriminalize
homosexuality and prostitution: that the men who engaged in it had a
right to do so or that government had no business impairing their right.
Rather, the sole concern that was articulated for decriminalizing family
violence was that criminal prosecution had not worked and had not
offered protection to the victims of violent husbands and fathers.
Although the drafters of Article 8 were not "expecting miracles," their
hope was that "not punishment, but practical help," was the best device
"for dealing with the underlying family difficulties" that often manifested
themselves in domestic violence.' 36
Thus, there began a curious attempt to decriminalize acts of domestic
violence' 37 and thereby "save the potential" of men who, "trapped by
circumstances over which they have no control," could not otherwise
"channel" personal "qualities" in a fashion beneficial to themselves and
"society" and thereby achieve their "right to self realization."'138 Article
8 aimed for this result by giving exclusive original jurisdiction over fam-
ily offense proceedings to the family court and requiring the criminal
courts to transfer to that court jurisdiction over proceedings previously
begun before them. 39 In assuming jurisdiction over family offense pro-
ceedings, however, the family courts of the state, and the appellate courts
above them, would need to focus on two main issues raised by the juris-
dictional provisions: (1) what constituted a family offense, and (2) what
constituted a family?
The early cases tended to construe the jurisdiction of the family court
generously and thus to extend the decriminalization effort broadly.
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled in 1967 that the family court should
assume original jurisdiction over all "family assaults.., and not simply
133. See Peter Wessel, Note, "Jurisdiction over Family Offenses in New York: A
Reconsideration of the Provisions for Choice of Forum," Syracuse Law Review 31 (1980): 601.
134. See Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives, 250-88.
135. See ibid., 254-55.
136. "Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, The Family Court Act,"
1962 N.Y. LAws 3428, 3444.
137. See Douglas J. Besharov, "Introductory Practice Commentary" to Article 8, N.Y. FAM.
Cr. ACT (McKinney 1983).
138. M. v. M., 336 N.Y.S.2d 304, 305, 309 (Faro. Ct. Bronx County 1972).
139. See An Act to Establish a Family Court, §§ 813-823, 1962 N.Y. LAws 686.
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those which were trivial."'1'4  Lower courts agreed,1 4 ' even when the
assault had been "a shocking offense-that the defendant placed his two-
year-old son on a hot stove." '14 2 Two years later the Court of Appeals
further extended this holding, in a case in which a defendant had been
indicted for burglary, in entering his estranged wife's apartment, and for
weapons possession, as a result of using a knife in assaulting her. The
court declared unanimously that the burglary and weapons charges were
"inextricably related" to the assault and that those charges therefore had
to be transferred to family court lest "[t]he purposes" of the legislature
"be subject to . .. likely circumvention."'143 The same was true of
charges of aggravated harassment.' 44 A charge of possession of the gun
used to assault a family member did not have to be transferred from
criminal to family court, however, since a gun, unlike a knife, was per se
a dangerous and unlawful instrument, whether or not it was used in an
assault.' 45 Likewise, homicide charges could be prosecuted initially in
criminal court, since with the family member's death "no domestic quar-
rel remained to remove for solution or help."" Courts also did not
require that cases of attempted homicide' 47 or of attempted use of motor
vehicles to kill or injure family members 4 be heard initially in family
court.
Sex offenses also were placed within the coverage of the Family Court
Act. Although sodomy between members of the same household appears
never to have been within the jurisdiction of the family court,1 49 the
Court of Appeals in 1969 reversed a conviction of assault with intent to
commit incest on the ground that jurisdiction of the case belonged in
family court rather than in criminal court.' 5 Following this case, a fam-
ily court judge in New York City accepted jurisdiction over a case of
incest between a 16-year-old male and his 12-year-old sister that led to
140. People v. Johnson, 282 N.Y.S.2d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 1967).
141. See People v. DeJesus, 250 N.Y.S.2d 317 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1964).
142. People v. Davis, 278 N.Y.S.2d 750, 756 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1967).
143. People v. Williams, 300 N.Y.S.2d 89, 98-99 (Ct. App. 1969).
144. See People v. McCarthy, 398 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977); People v. Hasse, 291
N.Y.S.2d 53 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1968). Since mere verbal harassment was not a crime, the
family court would not take cognizance of any petition alleging it. See DiDonna v. DiDonna, 339
N.Y.S.2d 592 (Fam. Ct. Ulster County 1972).
145. See People v. Wade, 296 N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1968); People v. Mancuso, 300
N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1969). But see People v. Oliver, 426 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1980); People v. Diggs, 339 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
146. People v. Brennan 306 N.Y.S.2d 384, 386 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1970). Accord Whiting v.
Shepard, 312 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1970).
147. See People v. Vaughn, 417 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1979); People v. Coady,
361 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974).
148. See People v. Bronson, 337 N.Y.S.2d 215 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1972). The family court
also would not take jurisdiction over a reckless use of an automobile by one spouse against another if
no criminal assault was involved. See Seymour v. Seymour, 289 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Fam. Ct. Tioga
County 1968).
149. See People ex rel. Doty v. Krueger, 302 N.Y.S.2d 605 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1969), appeal
dismissed, 309 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Ct. App. 1970).
150. See People v. Nuernbereger, 303 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1969).
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the birth of a child; the judge argued that only the family court could
"restor[e] the various members of this family to useful and less encum-
bered lives."I 5
The courts also extended the jurisdiction of the family court and
thereby narrowed the scope of the criminal law by construing the word
"family" in the Act to mean the extended rather than the nuclear family.
In referring to family court an indictment against a man who in the
course of an assault on his wife also assaulted his brother-in-law, one
judge noted that "marriage is a relationship which, as a matter of
essence, brings spouses and in-laws into contact, and into conflict." '52
Other cases likewise held that a man who assaulted his mother-in-law
1 53
and a man who assaulted his brother-in-law' 54 should have their cases
heard in family court, even though neither victim lived in the same house
as the man committing the assault. The courts in early cases also ruled
that the commencement of divorce proceedings did not terminate the
jurisdiction of the family court, 5 5 and the first judge to confront the
question even held that a final decree of divorce did "not cause a com-
plete severance between the spouses and a complete return to the status
quo as if their marriage had never existed," since the "problems of sup-
port and visitation of children.., result in a continuation of contact."' 56
Most early judges also construed the concept of family broadly when
they held that violence between a man and a woman who were living
together was subject to family rather than criminal court jurisdiction,
even if the two were not formally married. As one of these judges
observed, the "countless households where men and women reside with
their offspring... without being legally married" produced precisely the
kinds of "behavior problems, support problems, [and] mental and emo-
tional problems" for which, "from a social point of view, . . the unique
and flexible procedures and services available in the Family Court" could
provide "a remedy."' 57
By giving Article 8 a broad construction and thereby extending the
decriminalization effort instituted by the legislature, New York judges
illustrated how, as reformers hoped, legislation, judicial interpretation,
public opinion, and social science could be conjoined to address a societal
151. S. v. S., 311 N.Y.S.2d 169, 179 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
152. People v. Harkins, 268 N.Y.S.2d 482, 484 (Erie County Ct. 1966). But see Klemes v.
Sohnen, 303 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1969) (assault by man on his son's mother-in-law not
a family offense).
153. See People v. Keller, 234 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1962).
154. See People ex rel. Clifford v. Kreuger, 297 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
155. See Hrab v. Hrab, 332 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972). Cf. Ardis S. v. Sanford S.,
389 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Fam. Ct. Kings County 1976).
156. Koeppel v. Judges of Family Court, 254 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964).
But see People v. King, 300 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Fam. Ct. Dutchess County 1969).
157. People v. Dugar, 235 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1962). Accord People v.
James, 287 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968); People v. Johnson, 265 N.Y.S.2d 260
(Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
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problem. For students of the legal process, the story of Article 8 and its
judicial interpretation during the 1960s is an extraordinary one that
emphasizes how effortlessly legal change can occur when legislators and
judges do not behave confrontationally but instead cooperate with each
other in pursuit of an end supported both by public opinion and by social
science elites. Nevertheless, despite all the hopes and cooperation it
engendered, Article 8 did not eliminate family violence.
D. Pornography
A somewhat different pattern emerged in the law concerning pornog-
raphy, the fourth area in which decriminalization ultimately took place
during the 1950s and 1960s. Initially, the majority on the New York
Court of Appeals took a firm stand against decriminalization. In the
years following the close of World War II, many judges continued to
subordinate concerns for freedom of expression to a perceived need to
protect "the young as well as all other segments of the population from
the corrupt influences exerted through the lascivious literature." '158
Thus, in Hughes Tool Co. v. Fielding,'59 in which the license commis-
sioner of the City of New York had threatened to revoke the license of
any theater exhibiting the film called "The Outlaw," which he had found
to be obscene, a unanimous Court of Appeals upheld the commissioner's
"duty to protect public morals against exhibition of lewd, obscene or
indecent motion picture films.""
The lower courts initially behaved in a similar fashion. One court, for
example, sustained a denial of a license for a movie that told "of clandes-
tine affection and even illicit intercourse," followed by an "abortion...
to prevent disclosure through the birth of a child." '161 Similarly, in
Sheehan v. Valentine,'62 a lower court found that the city police commis-
sioner had exercised his discretion "wisely" 163 in denying a cabaret enter-
tainer's identification card to a man previously convicted of an indecent
assault. Indeed, the Court of Appeals went so far as to sustain censor-
ship of a magazine about "fiendish and gruesome crimes" that was
"besprinkled with lurid photographs of victims and perpetrators," on the
ground that it "appeal[ed] to that portion of the public who (as many
recent records remind us) are disposed to take to vice for its own
sake.""'6
158. People v. Richmond County News, 179 N.Y.S.2d 76, 81 (Ct. Spec. Sess. Richmond County
1958), rev'd, 205 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1960), afr'd, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1961).
159. 297 N.Y. 1024 (1948).
160. Hughes Tool Co. v. Fielding, 80 N.E.2d 540 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1948) (quoted language does
not appear in official New York Reports).
161. Distinguished Films v. Stoddard, 68 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (App. Div. 3d Dep't), leave to
appeal denied, 71 N.Y.S.2d 728 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1947).
162. 54 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945).
163. Ibid., 330.
164. People v. Winters, 294 N.Y. 545, 551 (1945), rev'd, 333 U.S. 507 (1946). But see People ex
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Postwar judges even remained offended by nudity. The "use of cloth-
ing to cover one's sexual organs," in one judge's view, had "been,
throughout history, the practice of all humans except for the lowest
grade of savages." Allowing nudity, he feared, would have "a libidinous
effect upon the most ordinary, normal, healthy individuals," and its
"effect upon the abnormal individual may be more disastrous." 1 6
5
Another judge asked that "Heaven help our future generations" if nudity
should ever come into "accord with the ethical and moral standards of
our community." 166 Yet another thought that "much greater police
activity in connection with pictures of female nudes and so-called art
books would appear to be indicated." 1 67
The repressive mindset of New York judges was so strong in the years
immediately following World War II that they felt comfortable, in People
v. Doubleday & Co. ,168 in suppressing a book of substantial literary merit
without even bothering to publish an opinion. The book's author,
Edmund Wilson, had already established a strong reputation as a critic
and essayist when Doubleday published Memoirs of Hecate County,
which won critical acclaim from the likes of Lionel Trilling, the New
York Times Book Review, and even Time magazine. Nonetheless, a
unanimous Appellate Division and a similarly unanimous Court of
Appeals issued per curiam afirmances of the unreported trial court judg-
ment. The case then went on to the United States Supreme Court, where
it was affirmed, again without opinion, by an equally divided Court, after
Justice Frankfurter had recused himself because of a personal friendship
with Wilson.' 69
Four years later the majority of the Court of Appeals again displayed
the same repressive mindset, in what may be the most important case of
all in setting today's moral tastes and standards, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson . 170 Burstyn arose when the state revoked the license it had
granted for the showing of an Italian movie, "I1 Miracolo," which was
distributed as part of a trilogy, "Ways of Love." According to the licens-
ing authority, the picture, whose first character, Saint Joseph, caused a
peasant girl named Mary to become intoxicated and pregnant with a
"'blessed son,'" was sacrilegious, as well as filled with "'drunkenness,
seduction ... and lewdness'" or, in the language of the script, "'ardent
rel. Kahan v. Creative Age Press, 79 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1948) (Charles 0.
Gorham's The Gilded Hearse held not obscene).
165. Sunshine Book County v. McCaffrey, 112 N.Y.S.2d 476, 483 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1952),
modified, 168 N.Y.S.2d 268 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1957).
166. People v. Eagle, 117 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Magis. Ct. Queens County 1952).
167. People v. Gonzales, 107 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1951).
168. 71 N.Y.S.2d 736 (App. Div. 1st Dep't) (per curiam), affd mem., 297 N.Y. 687 (1947), affd
by equally divided court, 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
169. See Lewis, Literature, Obscenity, and Law, 162-63.
170. 303 N.Y. 242 (1951).
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affection, . . sexual passion, gratification, [and] devotion.' ,"71 A 5-2
majority of the Court of Appeals sustained the revocation of the movie's
license. In an opinion that supported conventional morality not out of a
belief in its righteousness but out of a policy against insulting those who
still believed in it, the majority noted that the film's "ways of love"
amounted to nothing more than "insults" "hurl[ed] .. .at the deepest
and sincerest religious beliefs of others." "Insult, mockery, contempt
and ridicule," the majority added, could "be a deadly form of persecu-
tion." America, it observed, was "essentially a religious nation" and "a
land of religious freedom," and then the majority concluded:
[I]t would be strange indeed if our Constitution, intended to protect
that freedom, were construed as an instrument to uphold those who
publicly and sacrilegiously ridicule and lampoon the most sacred
beliefs of any religious denomination to provide amusement.17 2
Having won the New York Film Critics award as the best foreign lan-
guage film of 1950, "I1 Miracolo" also won some support on the Court of
Appeals in the form of a dissent from Judge Fuld. "[Confronted in this
case with censorship in its baldest form. . .- a prior restraint of broad
and undefined limits," Fuld found that the licensing scheme "consti-
tute[d] an attempt to legislate orthodoxy in matters of religious belief." 173
The "unquestioned good faith" of the people who found "I1 Miracolo"
"offensive to their religious sensibilities" could not make it legitimate to
"censor the free expression of ideas or beliefs in the field of religion."
" '[N]o official,' "Fuld concluded, could " 'prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.' ,171
When the majority of the United States Supreme Court agreed with
Fuld, it reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals 75 and
thereby began the process of abolishing most movie censorship. The fed-
eral Supreme Court, out of the necessities of its institutional position,
also began another new process that differentiated the decriminalization
of pornography from the early stages, at least, of the decriminalization of
homosexuality and prostitution. Unlike the state court, the federal court
did not construe legislation narrowly or reverse convictions on proce-
dural or evidentiary grounds; on the contrary, it declared state legislation
constitutionally invalid. Because the nature of federal jurisdiction
deprived the Supreme Court of the gentle power, which state judges
enjoyed, of engaging in a dialogue with state legislatures whereby the
courts limited the scope of the criminal law over victimless offenses but
171. Ibid., 257.
172. Ibid., 259-60 (emphasis added).
173. Ibid., 268.
174. Ibid., 276, quoting West Virgina State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943).
175. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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left the ultimate judgment on total decriminalization to the political pro-
cess, the federal Court had to arrogate that ultimate judgment to itself.
In arrogating such power, the Supreme Court effectively transformed the
meaning of decriminalization, from a process involving judicial sugges-
tion, political discussion, and ultimate legislative determination, to one of
judicial command.
The novelty of the step taken by the Supreme Court in Burstyn
emerged most dramatically, perhaps, in the difficulty that conservative
New York judges had in absorbing the Court's message. Thus, two years
after Burstyn, in Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents,176 the
Court of Appeals was back in the censorship business. The case involved
the French motion picture, "La Ronde," which portrayed a series of sex-
ual encounters primarily between men and women not married to each
other, including one episode between a soldier and a prostitute who
"informs him," in a manner reminiscent of much World War II practice,
"that 'civilians' pay, but for 'boys like you it's nothing.' ,177 Noting that
"La Ronde" "depict[ed] promiscuity as the natural and normal relation
between the sexes, whether married or unmarried,"'' 78 the majority con-
cluded that it "pander[ed] to base human emotions" and thereby consti-
tuted "a breeding ground for sensuality, depravity, licentiousness and
sexual immorality," which was "portrayed in such manner as to invite
concupiscence and condone its promiscuous satisfaction, with its evil
social consequences."' 179
The two dissenters observed that "La Ronde" had been banned
nowhere in the United States except New York, from which they con-
cluded that the movie was "not inimical to the public peace, welfare and
safety" and was "not offensive" to "a large segment of society."' 8 0 They
accordingly refused to join in banning it, as did the United States
Supreme Court, which reversed the Court of Appeals's judgment.' 8 '
Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents 8 2 was yet another
attempt by the Court of Appeals at movie censorship, despite Judge
Fuld's warning in dissent that any system of prior administrative censor-
ship was unconstitutional.8 3 The majority, however, was out "to pro-
tect" the people from the "abuses"'8 4 that the movie, "Lady Chatterley's
Lover," would impose on them. It was astounded that the movie exalted
"illicit sexual love in derogation of the restraints of marriage," presented
the "complete surrender" of the leading characters "to the baser instincts





181. See Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
182. 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1958).
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... as a triumph over the social mores," and heralded their "decision to
live in adultery... as a conquest of love over the 'form' of marriage."' "
Banning "Lady Chatterley's Lover," the court said in language reminis-
cent of Thomas E. Dewey's 1944 presidential campaign, was "necessary
for our survival as a nation in an age of open conflict with atheistic mate-
rialism." '86 Again, however, the federal Supreme Court disagreed.1"7
Despite emerging federal standards, a 4-3 majority of the Court of
Appeals as late as 1963 had a similar reaction to Henry Miller's Tropic of
Cancer. The majority was responding in part, perhaps, to its "increased
awareness of the serious problem" created by the "ever-increasing
amount of printed material featuring sex and sensationalism... sold not
only in bookstores but from open racks in candy stores and similar out-
lets." The result was "an alarming decline in the moral climate of our
times."18 It found Tropic of Cancer to be "nothing more than a compi-
lation of a series of sordid narrations dealing with sex"-"dirt for dirt's
sake."' 8 9 In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Desmond found the
"whole book [to be] 'sick sensuality,'" with "[n]o glory, no beauty, no
stars-just mud." Despite the recent Supreme Court cases that he cited,
he believed it "unthinkable that the practical political thinkers who
wrote the Bill of Rights ever intended to protect downright foulness" and
hence concluded that "something must remain of the ancient police
power of the States ... to ban stuff as filthy as 'Tropic of Cancer.' ,,9
However, because they remanded the case for a new trial on other
grounds, Desmond and his colleagues in the majority never had the
opportunity to learn how badly they had misread both Henry Miller's
Tropic of Cancer and the Supreme Court's emerging caselaw.
Gradually, however, the New York courts began to conform to the
more libertarian federal standards. One year prior to the suppression of
"Lady Chatterley's Lover," the Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision in the
Excelsior Pictures case authorized the exhibition of "a fictionalized depic-
tion of the activities of the members of a nudist group in a secluded pri-
vate camp in Florida," in which the "pictured episodes" were " 'honestly
relevant to the adequate expression of innocent ideas.' "191 Nonetheless,
three judges still dissented because, although "[v]iews of the adults' pri-
vate parts [were] not shown to the audience," the "genitalia of children
and girls [sic] and the buttocks and breasts of men and women [were]
revealed," and, moreover, "the picture contain[ed] specific protracted
185. Ibid., 42.
186. Ibid., 52.
187. See Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
188. People v. Fritch, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3-4 (Ct. App. 1963).
189. Ibid., 6.
190. Ibid., 8, 10.
191. Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (Ct. App. 1957), quoting United
States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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scenes of women in unwholesome, sexually alluring postures. '192
Even though Excelsior Pictures did not extend so far, the lower courts
read it as placing all displays of mere nudity, which New York judges
had traditionally treated as obscene, within the constitutionally protected
scope of free expression. 193 Similarly, Connection Co. v. Regents1 94 held
that "use of the word 'shit' . . . not in its usual connotation but as a
definitive expression of the language of the narcotic" was not obscene.195
Meanwhile, an early case had declined to censor a movie about a teenage
drug addict, despite the argument of the censors that "use of heroin and
marijuana is directed to ... people who seek sensual pleasures" and that
"[w]here drugs are used in mixed company, sexual immorality is gener-
ally the motivation and end result."1 96 Another case had licensed a
movie that "portray[ed] under restrained and controlled conditions, a
human birth," in the form of "a biological demonstration, scientific in
level and tone." 197
Soon a 4-3 majority of the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge
Fuld, went even farther, declaring that only the "sexually morbid,
grossly perverse and bizarre" was obscene and thereby outside the scope
of constitutional protection. 98 Although "[a]dolescents may be hurt by"
such a standard and "[v]irtuous adults will reject it (as all of us Judges
would were we not restrained by the Roth-Alberts legal test)," even
Chief Judge Desmond in concurrence knew that his "prepossessions"
were "not the law," which "in a pluralist society" could "not regulate
literary standards or give expression to the loftiest virtues." 199 The court
also accepted federal doctrine that a seller of obscene material could not
be held criminally liable without proof of scienter,2° thereby increasing
the protection for obscenity.2 "1 By the early 1970s the Court of Appeals
had fully jumped aboard the libertarian bandwagon, when it reversed for
vagueness in the specification of obscenity a conviction resulting from a
police raid on a Rochester bookstore, which had netted 126 separately
192. Ibid., 51.
193. See People v. Urban, 222 N.Y.S.2d 461 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1961); Calderon v. City of
Buffalo, 397 N.Y.S.2d 655, 661 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1977), aftd, 402 N.Y.S.2d 685 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1978); People v. Stabile, 296 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1969); People v. Kaplan,
252 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
194. 230 N.Y.S.2d 103 (App. Div. 3d Dep't), affd, 234 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Ct. App. 1962). Accord
People v. Vanguard Press, 84 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1947) (use of four-letter
words did not make a book obscene).
195. Connection Co. v. Regents, 230 N.Y.S.2d 103, 103.
196. Broadway Angels, Inc. v. Wilson, 125 N.Y.S.2d 546, 549 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1953).
197. Capitol Enterprises v. Regents, 149 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1956).
198. People v. Richmond County News, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 376 (Ct. App. 1961).
199. Ibid., 378.
200. See People v. Finkelstein, 214 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Ct. App. 1961). For an earlier lower court
opinion reaching the same result, see People on Complaint of Callaghan v. Bunis, 198 N.Y.S.2d 568
(Buffalo City Ct. 1960).
201. See also People v. J.W. Productions, 413 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (city
may not deny licenses to movie theaters previously convicted of showing obscene movies).
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titled books and calendars depicting "'scenes of nude persons' " and of
"'the female and male genital organs,... including the male penis and
the female breasts.' ",202
But sexual pleasure and liberty did not triumph entirely. "'Patently
offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sex acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated, [and/or] ... of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals' "203 remained obscene and
thus outside the scope of constitutional protection. Although the Court
of Appeals upheld legislative attempts to apply stricter standards in
regard to sales to minors,2 °1 the New York courts gave adults in the
1970s access to all but what it declared to be the most hard-core materi-
als, such as dildos;205 advertisements "soliciting. . . acts of sodomy, and
wife-swapping orgies";" photographs of "young men," one of them
"hardly more than a boy," all "in various stages of undress," engaged in
"embracing, wrestling, spanking, beating, or... manually soap-lathering
the genitalia of the other";207 magazines rating motion pictures "by a
'Peter Meter,' a drawing of a penis superimposed upon a scale" which
rates the picture "according to the percentage of erection" which the
picture induces;20 and live sex shows, which "include[d] simulated het-
erosexual copulation by nude performers, masturbation, and three kinds
of sodomy. '"209
Although judges found that material such as this, ranging from the
ribald to the disgusting, "furnish[ed] escape literature to those who...
'because of lack of education, the meanness of their social existence, or
mental insufficiency, cannot cope with anything better,' ,210 they also
found it too lewd and lascivious to merit First Amendment protection.
Their conclusion is puzzling, given the fact that they did not find nude
sunbathing lascivious, 2  even when engaged in by "a woman in her late
202. People v. Abronovitz, 335 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1972).
203. People v. Heller, 352 N.Y.S.2d 601, 612 (Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Buckley v.
New York, 418 U.S. 944 (1974), quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). Accord Trans-
Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Ct. App. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 259 (1965).
204. See People v. Hartman, 297 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1968); People v. Tannenbaum, 274
N.Y.S.2d 131 (Ct. App. 1966), appeal dismissed, 388 U.S. 439 (1967), conviction vacated, 296
N.Y.S.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1968); Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed, 385 U.S. 12 (1966).
205. See People v. Buckley, 320 N.Y.S.2d 91, 96 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1971) (dictum), aff'd,
340 N.Y.S.2d 191 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1972), affid sub nom. People v. Heller, 352 N.Y.S.2d 601
(Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Buckley v. New York, 418 U.S. 944 (1974); People v. Clark,
304 N.Y.S.2d 326 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
206. Buckley, 320 N.Y.S.2d 91, 97.
207. People v. G.I. Distributors, 281 N.Y.S.2d 795, 796-97 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 905
(1967).
208. Buckley, 320 N.Y.S.2d 91, 94.
209. People v. Bercowitz, 308 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
210. People v. Birch, 269 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (App. Div. 2d Dep't) appeal dismissed, 274
N.Y.S.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1966), quoting People v. Birch, 243 N.Y.S.2d 525, 530 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1963).
211. See People v. Hardy, 357 N.Y.S.2d 970 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1974).
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twenties" who "was observed playing with a ball, swimming, waving at a
passing boat, slowly applying suntan lotion (to the frontal portion of her
body including her breasts and down to her pubic hair)," being photo-
graphed, and "sunbathing on a blanket (arms behind her propping her
up, legs outstretched and knees approximately twelve to eighteen inches
apart)."2 2 Similarly, there was nothing wrong with a man's wilful and
lewd exposure of his private parts before two or more women, as long as
he committed the act in the cellar of his own home.213 With the courts
unwilling to enforce the indecent exposure laws in numerous other
cases,2" 4 the only situation in which the statute seemed to be enforced
was when a man exposed himself in a car in front of young children215 or
on subway platforms or the equivalent.
When the practice of nude and topless dancing arose in bars and res-
taurants in the early 1970s, the courts leaned toward the view that it
could not be prohibited. Thus, although several trial court judges sus-
tained state and local legislation prohibiting the practice,2" 6 all the appel-
late judges who considered the issue declared the legislation invalid,217 as
did some lower court judges,218 even where "a nude dancer ... touched
the area of her private parts, laid on the floor on a rug and performed
dance maneuvers while lying there. ' 219 It was similarly held that taking
212. People v. Gilbert, 338 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 1972). The court did,
however, find her guilty of indecent exposure. See People v. Gilbert, 339 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Crim. Ct.
Kings County 1973).
213. See People v. Dohen, 116 N.Y.S.2d 351 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1952).
214. See People v. Case, 227 N.Y.S.2d 212 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 849
(1962); People v. Westervelt, 218 N.Y.S.2d 77 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1961); People v. Abbate, 216
N.Y.S.2d 443 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1961); People v. Lardarello, 209 N.Y.S.2d 913 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1961); People v. Thompson, 113 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1952); People v. Smookler,
52 N.Y.S.2d 616 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1945); People v. Lagani, 159 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Westchester
County Ct. 1957). In all these cases, lack of evidence was the only ground stated for voiding
convictions. What may have been at stake in these cases is illustrated, perhaps, by an earlier case, in
which "a young man of previous unblemished character, well educated, of a good home, and...
steadily employed" had his conviction reversed since his act of exposure "may have been 'the result
of carelessness and negligence in dress.'" People v. Ulman, 16 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1939).
215. See People v. Palladino, 237 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Westchester County Ct. 1962).
216. See People v. Morgan, 382 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1976); People v. Karns,
365 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Rochester City Ct. 1975); People v. Moreira, 333 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk
County 1972); and Brandon Shores, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Greenwood Lake, 325 N.Y.S.2d
957 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1971).
217. See TJPC Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Authority, 402 N.Y.S.2d 483 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1978), affid, 424 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1979); People v. Nixon, 390 N.Y.S.2d 518 (App.
Term 9th & 10th Dists. 1976).
218. See Lucifer's Gate, Inc. v. Town of VanBuren, 373 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1975); People v. Conte, 315 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1969). Cf. Beck v.
Wallander, 71 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947) (city could not deny license to
cabaret dancer who had previously danced with "her breasts and lower part of her torso . . .
exposed"); Application of DuBarry Caterers, Inc., 105 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1951)
(city may not deny license to catering firm which had previously failed to stop indecent
entertainment, of which it had no knowledge, occurring at a meeting on the premises of a fraternal
lodge).
219. TJPC Restaurant Corp., 402 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (statement of facts from dissenting
opinion).
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pictures of nudes in photography studios was constitutionally pro-
tected,220 although similar photography at a "farm outing" where guests
paid $10 for the privilege of "photographing female models, some of
whom posed in the nude," had earlier been held to violate the indecent
exposure laws.221
When all the cases are examined in conjunction, the difficulty of dis-
cerning clear lines between the permissible and the impermissible in the
area of obscenity becomes apparent. One sensible distinction might have
been between acts and pictures, and, at times, that distinction was drawn.
One judge, for example, noted that he had "no difficulty in distinguishing
between the interests served in 'topless dancing' and that of the study of
the female form,"2 22 and another held that, even when the First Amend-
ment protected "the dissemination of [sexually explicit] printed or photo-
graphic material," that protection did "not shield one against a
prosecution for a [sex] crime [namely, prostitution] committed" during
the course of filming.223 But this distinction would have cut in favor of
giving verbal and pictorial expression even more protection, perhaps,
than the courts gave it, while acts of nude sunbathing and nude dancing
would have received less protection.
A second distinction might have focused on the difference between acts
of individual "self-expression" and "'bald attempt[s] to profit on inde-
cent exposure.' ,,224 On occasion, the New York courts seem to have
"examine[d] the method of advertising and exploiting" sexually explicit
material to determine its obscenity,225 as called for by the "pandering"
test of Ginzberg v. United States.226 But the profit motive was, after all,
at the heart of most motion picture production, and greater emphasis on
profit would not have led to the end of movie censorship that in fact
occurred.
A third possibility is that the judiciary drew the line where it did out of
a concern, frequently expressed as late as the 1950s, that lifting restric-
tions on sexual expression would produce social disorder. The prosecu-
tion of three defendants for harassing police tends to support this
explanation: in the first, the defendant called a state police investigator
an "asshole"; 227 in the second, a student protesting the Vietnam War
"uttered an obscene epithet and made an obscene gesture" to a police-
220. See People v. Wilhelm, 330 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Buffalo City Ct. 1972).
221. Carr v. Hoy, 158 N.Y.S.2d 572, 574 (Ct. App. 1957).
222. Moreira, 333 N.Y.S.2d 215, 221.
223. People v. Kovner, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349, 352 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
224. Moreira, 333 N.Y.S.2d 215, 220, quoting J.D.H. Rest. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
279 N.Y.S.2d 975, 976 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1967).
225. People v. Weingarten, 271 N.Y.S.2d 158, 162 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1966), affid, 286
N.Y.S.2d 429 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 306 N.Y.S.2d 17 (Ct. App. 1969).
226. 383 U.S. 463, 470 n.ll (1966).
227. People v. Cecere, 334 N.Y.S.2d 83, 89 (Batavia City Ct. 1972).
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man during a parade; 22 in the third, a black defendant called a white
policeman "a jackass" and said that "the officer shouldn't treat colored
people like dogs.",229 The acquittal of the last two defendants and the
conviction only of the first militates against this explanation, however.
As the inadequacy of all three of these explanations demonstrates, the
emergence of constitutional limitations on the criminalization of pornog-
raphy had "evoked passion," as conservatives spoke of "the poison of
obscenity" and libertarians "deplored another breach in the constitu-
tional bulwark against repression." But newly formulated doctrines did
not bring "clarity" either "to the constitutional questions or to the social
questions" raised by pornography.23 ° The reason for the confusion,
according to a 1963 article by Louis Henkin that saw pornography law as
the analog of legislation against homosexuality and prostitution, was that
the Supreme Court and the commentators had refused to examine the
central issue raised by its obscenity cases-"the right of constitutional
government to legislate morality which has no secular, utilitarian, or
social purpose." In Henkin's view, it was time "to define and articulate
the extent to which the religious antecedents of our values may continue
to motivate our governments in the enactment and enforcement of
law."'23' At the time Henkin wrote, his analysis of the issue at stake in
pornography, as well as homosexuality and prostitution, surely seemed
correct. But, as the next section of this essay, which deals with the law of
rape, will soon suggest, another issue-the exploitation of women by
men-lurked beneath the surface and would soon emerge.
E. Rape
No one, of course, ever proposed to decriminalize rape. At the height
of the efforts to decriminalize homosexuality, prostitution, family vio-
lence, and pornography, the law treated what has been labelled "real
rape"'232-that is, cases of attacks on women by strangers-as a heinous
crime. Indeed, as the judges on the Court of Appeals noted in one 1950
case, the "protection of women in a county with sparsely settled sections
[was] one of the responsibilities" of courts and prosecutors, and contrary
to its proclivity in other areas, the court was prepared in cases of "real
rape" to construe criminal statutes broadly to achieve that end.233 But a
totally different attitude governed when women claimed rape by men
whom they knew, such as dates, ex-husbands, and ex-lovers. As one
scholar explained:
228. People v. Benders, 312 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (Buffalo City Ct. 1970).
229. People v. Brown, 303 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Justice's Ct. Rockland County 1969).
230. Louis Henkin, "Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity," Columbia Law Review
63 (1963): 391.
231. Ibid., 414.
232. Susan Estrich, "Rape," Yale Law Journal 95 (1986): 1087, 1088.
233. People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 53 (1950).
1993]
37
Nelson: Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920-1980
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1993
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
When a woman is familiar with a man she claims has raped her
there is always a question as to whether the force used in obtaining
sexual intercourse was brought on by her own provocation. Many
women with hysterical personality features are unusually seductive
in their relationships with men. Sometimes their efforts at being
charming arouse erotic reactions.... This suspicion can be legiti-
mately raised when a woman has known her attacker, has accepted
dates with him and has indulged in some kissing and petting.234
In such cases, the New York courts prior to the 1970s were loathe indeed
to subject men to the criminal process, and, in order to leave men free,
they did exactly what they had done in their efforts to decriminalize
homosexuality and prostitution: they altered technical legal doctrines
surrounding the law of rape so as to increase the difficulty of obtaining
criminal convictions.
The large number of written opinions in rape cases necessitates the
division of the subject into sub-categories. Thus, this section will focus
on two important rules of evidence which were manipulated in ways that
limited use of the criminal process during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.
First, this section will analyze the rule requiring corroboration of a rape
victim's testimony. Second, it will turn to the rule requiring a victim to
resist an attack to her utmost and treating lack of resistance as evidence
of consent. Finally, it will consider other doctrinal issues raised by the
changing law of rape.
1. The Corroboration Issue
Until the 1970s, no one questioned the requirement that a conviction
could not be had for rape unless the testimony of the prosecutrix was
duly corroborated.23 This requirement, which had been codified by stat-
ute long before 1920, was "not a mere rule of evidence, but a settled
legislative declaration that such uncorroborated testimony is inherently
untrustworthy. '23 6 "[F]ounded on centuries of social and legal experi-
ence," the corroboration requirement, as stated in one case, "wisely rec-
ognize[d] that some complainants are designing or vicious" and that in
the absence of the rule defendants would be at these women's
,,mercy.,,2 37
Cases in the first half of the century suggest that the requirement was a
substantial one. Corroboration, it was said, had to extend to every mate-
234. Seymour L. Halleck, "Emotional Effects of Victimization," in Sexual Behavior and the
Law, ed. Ralph Slovenko (Springfield, Ill.: C.C. Thomas, 1965), 673, 675.
235. See, for example, People v. Yannucci, 283 N.Y. 546, 549 (1940); People v. Page, 162 N.Y.
272 (1900); People v. Cunningham, 95 N.Y.S.2d 189 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1950); People v.
Pandeline, 251 N.Y.S. 384 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1931).
236. Eric R. v. Ploskitt, 312 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1970).
237. People v. Yannucci, 15 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1939) (dictum), rev'd on
other grounds, 283 N.Y. 546 (1940).
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rial fact essential to constitute the crime charged, 23 ' and for that reason
the courts held that pregnancy and birth of a child would not by itself
corroborate a claim of rape.239 Similarly, medical testimony that the
complainant's hymen was broken was held not to constitute corrobora-
tion when the doctor could not account for how it had been broken.24 °
But medical testimony combined with the statement of another young
girl whom the defendant had raped did amount to sufficient corrobora-
tion,24' as did testimony that the defendant was at the complainant's
house near the time of the offense.242 A confession also constituted suffi-
cient corroboration,243 although a statement by a defendant that he
" 'fooled with her, but. . didn't rape her'" did not.244 The courts also
held that the prosecution need not offer corroborating evidence of the
actual fact of penetration; this was "'necessarily the rule, else few con-
victions could be secured even in flagrant cases.' ",243
Cases decided after 1950 not only continued to adhere to traditional
corroboration requirements,246 but also displayed a tendency to become
even more stringent than before. Thus, People on Complaint of Lore v.
Smith247 reversed the old rule and declared that corroboration "must
extend to the element of penetration. '248 Similarly, In the Matter of Wil-
liam S. 249 declared, apparently for the first time, that evidence of similar
sex crimes against others could not be introduced to corroborate the
charges on trial,250 while two cases held that the requisite corroboration
could not come from a confession, 25' although one of them held that the
238. People v. Lammes, 203 N.Y.S. 736, 737 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1924).
239. See People v. Anthony, 293 N.Y. 649 (1944); People v. Whitson, 234 N.Y. 517 (1922), rev'g
185 N.Y.S. 590 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1921); People v. Hornbeck, 101 N.Y.S.2d 182 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1950); People v. Palmer, 200 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1923); People v. Karlan, 13
N.Y.S.2d 482 (Queens County Ct. 1939).
240. See People v. Brehm, 218 N.Y.S. 469, 473-74 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1926). See also People v.
Croes, 285 N.Y. 279 (1941).
241. See People v. Hop Sing, 215 N.Y.S. 301 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1926). Accord People v.
Wright, 16 N.Y.S.2d 593, 595 (Columbia County Ct. 1940).
242. See People v. Deitsch, 237 N.Y. 300 (1923); People v. Wright, 17 N.Y.S.2d 382, 383
(Columbia County Ct. 1940).
243. See People v. Tubbs, 267 N.Y.S. 846 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1933), affid, 264 N.Y. 641
(1934).
244. People v. Downs, 236 N.Y. 306, 309 (1923).
245. People v. Haskall, 210 N.Y.S. 337, 338 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County), agf'd, 213 N.Y.S. 878
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1925), quoting People v. DeNigris, 142 N.Y.S. 620, 621 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1913). Accord People v. Van Allen, 89 N.Y.S.2d 594, 601 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1949). See also
People v. McDuffee, 63 N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. Div. 3d Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 64 N.Y.S.2d 671
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1946) (evidence sufficiently corroborative). But see People v. Romano, 300
N.Y.S.2d 366 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1937) (evidence not corroborative).
246. See, for example, Matter of Steven D.G., 349 N.Y.S.2d 754 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1973)
(statement of defendant that "she went with me" held not sufficient corroboration); People v.
Tashman, 233 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962) (pregnancy not sufficient corroboration).
247. 256 N.Y.S.2d 422 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1965).
248. Ibid., 425.
249. 333 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Fam. Ct. Kings County 1972).
250. Ibid., 471-72.
251. See People v. Perez, 269 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1966); People v. Dunbar, 130
N.Y.S.2d 59, 63-64 (Magis. Ct. Queens County 1954) (dictum).
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defendant's confession together with the complainant's pregnancy would
be sufficient corroboration.252
Several cases of special factual difficulty came before the Court of
Appeals. One was People v. Porcaro,253 in which a ten-year-old girl testi-
fied to her father's "having regular and frequent sexual intercourse" with
her "during four years, in the usual manner as well as through her
mouth." Noting that "a matrimonial dispute [was] in the back-
ground, ' 254 the plurality opinion of Judge VanVoorhis implied that the
girl's testimony was unreliable without corroboration, and Judge Fuld in
a separate concurrence would have reversed because, "as a matter of law,
no conviction for impairing the morals of a child may validly rest on the
uncorroborated testimony of the child victim. ' 255 VanVoorhis in fact
reversed on the narrower ground that the defendant claimed the girl was'
a virgin and was not permitted to have her medically examined as "com-
mon fairness require[d]. 256
The companion case of People v. Oyola 257 was even more difficult.
There, the defendant's ten-year-old daughter
testified to all the particulars of a completed act of intercourse upon
her by her father, soon after she had retired for the night. She said
that she had on her nightgown, and that he was clothed. In spite of
the early arrival of both mother and the police, no evidence was
offered ... of any examination of the child's body, nor the finding of
any residual evidence of a seminal emission in or about the child's
sex organs, adjacent area nor on any other portion of her body, bed-
clothes or nightgown nor upon appellant's clothing or anywhere
else.258
The only corroboration offered was defendant's statement to his wife
" 'that it was true what he had done' " and that " 'he was sorry for what
he did to his daughter.' "259 Writing for the majority, Judge VanVoorhis
observed that "testimony by complainants in these cases" should be dis-
trusted since "errant young girls and women are given to 'contriving
false charges of sexual offenses by men' " and " 'sinister possibilities of
injustice . . . lurk[ed] in believing' " them. 2 '° He accordingly reversed
Oyola's conviction for want of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge
252. See People v. Dunbar, 130 N.Y.S.2d 59, 64 (Magis. Ct. Queens County 1954).
253. 189 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1959).
254. See ibid., 195. See also People v. Moore, 230 N.Y.S.2d 880, 885-86 (App. Div. 3d Dep't),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 838 (1962), in which the court noted that a pending divorce action was
"germane to the motivation leading to the prosecution" of a father for raping his stepdaughter.
255. Porcaro, 189 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197.
256. Ibid., 196.
257. 189 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1959).
258. Ibid., 204-5.
259. Ibid., 208.
260. Oyola, 189 N.Y.S.2d 203, 208, quoting John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-
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Desmond dissented in both Porcaro and Oyola, noting in the latter that
there "never has been a rule ... requiring corroboration of the sworn
testimony of... infant complainants,... [and] such a rule would be very
much against the public interest."26
In two other cases, there was no doubt that the complainants had been
raped, yet convictions were still reversed for lack of corroboration. In
the one, a 17-year-old school girl ran home after the rape, appearing with
a bloodied mouth, bruised lips, disheveled appearance and apparent emo-
tional distress. She described the defendant's car, as well as a ring worn
by her attacker and found on the defendant at the time of his arrest, and
a medical examination verified that intercourse had taken place and that
the complainant had been physically abused.262 In the other, the victim
made prompt complaint, was in a distraught emotional state immediately
after the alleged assault, and had bruises on her body.263
Sufficient corroboration tended to be found only where evidence of the
defendant's guilt was overwhelming, as where the complainant's blood or
a piece of her clothing were found in the defendant's car,264 or the
defendant's fingerprints were found in the complainant's car and he was
found near where it was wrecked.265 Corroboration was also held to
exist in a case in which a defendant did not deny getting the prosecutrix
pregnant and further admitted "'having a crush on'" her and "'neck-
ing' with her in the early morning hours in a parked automobile. '266 In a
weaker case, in which the only corroboration was that intercourse had
occurred, that the defendant had been observed in the vicinity near the
time thereof, and that the complainant had thrown a jewelry box, alleg-
edly to protect herself, four judges of the Court of Appeals voted to
affirm the rape conviction,267 but three others-Judges Desmond, Fuld,
and VanVoorhis--dissented on the ground that "no 'other evidence' "
apart from the complainant's testimony identified the defendant as the
perpetrator. 268 Although they did not so indicate, the dissenters may
also have doubted whether a rape had actually occurred, since the evi-
dence showed that the defendant and the complainant were engaged in a
friendly dialogue before their act of intercourse occurred.
As it became increasingly difficult to satisfy the corroboration require-
261. Ibid., 211.
262. See People v. Linzy, 335 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1972).
263. See People v. Watson, 410 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Ct. App. 1978).
264. See People v. Garland, 346 N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1973) (blood); People v.
Marshall, 172 N.Y.S.2d 237 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1958), afid, 188 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1959)
(clothing).
265. See People v. Spinks, 326 N.Y.S.2d 261 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1971).
266. People v. Imperiale, 180 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817-18 (Ct. Spec. Sess. Kings County 1957).
267. See People v. Masse, 182 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Ct. App. 1959).
268. Ibid., 825. Compare also People v. Roman, 402 N.Y.S.2d 405 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1978)
(unspecified evidence insufficient corroboration), with People v. Duegaw, 312 N.Y.S.2d 518 (App.
Div. 3d Dep't 1970) (unspecified evidence sufficient corroboration).
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ment, prosecutors in cases involving completed rapes sought to circum-
vent the requirement by indicting defendants only for attempted rape or
for assault with intent to rape. Until approximately 1960, nearly all these
cases held that a defendant accused by a complainant of a completed
rape for which inadequate evidence of corroboration existed could be
convicted without corroboration for either an attempt 269 or an assault,27°
although not, of course, for both.27'
The Court of Appeals began to reverse these rules, however. In People
v. Lo Verde, 272 a teenage girl accused a teenage boy of forcible rape, but in
the absence of corroboration, the jury found him guilty only of an act of
intercourse that endangered the morals of a minor. In reversing his con-
viction, the court observed that under the established rules which had
been applied by the jury "a prosecutor might easily circumvent the
requirement of corroboration necessary for a conviction of misdemeanor
rape simply by charging instead the impairment of the morals of a minor,
as he did here. The law," the court added, "may not be so
circumvented. '2 7
3
The Court of Appeals continued to increase the difficulty of prosecut-
ing cases of forced sex. In People v. English,274 in a 4-3 memorandum
decision, it reversed convictions for attempted rape and assault with
intent to commit rape on the ground of lack of corroboration. The rule
in English was designed "as a matter of policy.., to prevent the prosecu-
tor from settling for the lesser conviction simply because of his inability
to obtain the requisite corroboration. ' 275 It soon led, however, to outra-
geous results, as demonstrated by another case that came before the
court, People v. Radunovic.276
Radunovic arose when a prosecutor, seeking to avoid the need for cor-
roboration in a rape prosecution, brought only a charge of assault against
a high school student who had attacked his teacher. The majority of the
Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge VanVoorhis, reversed the con-
269. See People v. McGhee, 244 N.Y.S.2d 500 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1963); People v. Manwaring,
162 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1957); People v. Phillips, 197 N.Y.S. 567 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1922), affd, 235 N.Y. 579 (1923). But cf. People v. Cosad, 1 N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1937).
270. See People v. DeGroat, 173 N.Y.S.2d 169 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1958), affd, 183 N.Y.S.2d
565 (Ct. App. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 284 (1960); People v. Chimino, 58 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App.
Div. 4th Dep't 1945), affid, 296 N.Y. 554 (1946); People v. Dixon, 234 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1962); People v. Girolyme, 78 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), affd, 79 N.Y.S.2d
885 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1948). But see People v. Adler, 73 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1947). Of course, if the assault resulted in the death of the victim, the assailant could also be
prosecuted for and convicted of murder. See People v. Harris, 121 N.Y.S.2d 868, 871 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1953), a.0'd, 306 N.Y. 345 (1954).
271. See People v. Williams, 19 N.Y.S.2d 780 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1940).
272. 195 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1959).
273. Ibid., 836.
274. 262 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1965).
275. People v. Reynolds, 307 N.Y.S.2d 201, 204 (Ct. App. 1969).
276. People v. Radunovic, 287 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Ct. App. 1967).
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viction. Van Voorhis held that when the only evidence of assault was the
complainant's testimony of a completed rape, corroboration was
required, and he further held that bruises on the victim's thigh and medi-
cal testimony that her hymen was intact shortly before but not after the
alleged assault was not sufficient corroboration.
This case produced some vehement dissents. One by Judge Scileppi
called the majority opinion "a license to commit rape," since the crime
was "hardly ever committed in the presence of others" and the necessary
corroboration was therefore almost always unobtainable. He found this
"an intolerable situation" when "the incidence of attacks on women ...
[was] steadily increasing." '277 As Judge Conway had declared only a few
years earlier, the conservatives on the court were generally "disturbed"
by "appeals... to the sexual appetite" and "by the increasing marks of
moral laxity," and they were "unable to look upon [this] moral disinte-
gration as a mere change in custom."27 Taking what would soon be
seen as more of a feminist approach, Judge Bergan noted in a companion
dissent that, "[i]f a man had been assaulted," the evidence of bruises
"would be sufficient; it ought to be sufficient, too, if a woman is
assaulted." '279
Nonetheless English and Radunovic were the law, and the lower
courts uniformly applied the rule of the two cases to invalidate convic-
tions both for attempted rape28 ° and assault with intent to commit
rape28 1 when the actual crime was a completed rape. Conviction could
be had for an attempt or assault only if the evidence showed that the
defendant tried to have intercourse but failed.28 2 Such holdings led, of
course, to the absurd and anomalous result that "one who makes a sexual
attack on a woman can be convicted without corroboration if he falls
short of satisfying his lust, but not if he succeeds." '283 Thus, the law
directed men who, even in ambiguous circumstances, had used only the
slightest force in the service of passion to press forward to the end, while
277. Ibid., 38-39.
278. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39, 50 (Ct. App. 1958), rev'd, 360
U.S. 684 (1959).
279. Radunovic, 287 N.Y.S.2d 33, 39-40.
280. See People v. J.T. Nixon, 374 N.Y.S.2d 491 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975); People v. Halpern,
289 N.Y.S.2d 130 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1968), affid, 313 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1970); People v.
Moore, 286 N.Y.S.2d 296 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1967), affid, 297 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Ct. App. 1969), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 1006 (1969).
281. See People v. Butt, 313 N.Y.S.2d 461 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1970); People v. Jenkins, 284
N.Y.S.2d 302 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1967), affid, 291 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1968); People v.
Coleman, 284 N.Y.S.2d 334 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1967), affrd sub nom. People v. Jenkins, 291
N.Y.S.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1968); People v. King, 273 N.Y.S.2d 925 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1966); People
v. Debe, 264 N.Y.S.2d 396 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1965); People v. Curtis, 265 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1965).
282. People v. L.B. Nixon, 374 N.Y.S.2d 491 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975). Cf. People v. Colon,
265 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1965) (case remanded to determine whether defendant's acts "amounted
to an unconsummated attempt to rape").
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it directed women who complained to the police of a rape to assert at
trial, presumably falsely, that their "condition at the time of the assault
was such" that they "couldn't say that there had been a consummated
rape.' 28
4
2. The Consent Issue
By definition, rape is forcible sexual intercourse, and thus a defendant
can always negate his guilt by showing that the complainant consented to
sexual relations. Black-letter law, which remained constant throughout
the period under study, demanded that a woman offer her utmost resist-
ance to the attack or at least "'as much resistance as she possibly could
under the circumstances and the facts'" of the case.285 From the 1950s
until the mid-1970s, judges applied this doctrine strictly, and men
accordingly enjoyed the benefit of the doubt if a woman's reaction to a
demand for intercourse was in the least ambiguous.
Two of the mid-1970s cases that failed to produce convictions were
paradigmatic. In People .Evans,28 6 the defendant used the pretense of
being a psychologist to lure a college sophomore into his apartment,
where he put her in fear by remarking that she was in" 'the apartment of
a strange man'" and that he " 'could kill' " or "'rape " her. After he
next yelled and screamed, he broke down and told the sophomore about
"his lost love," who had committed suicide. When she reached out for
him, he grabbed her, announcing "'You're mine, you are mine.'" They
then slept together for the night, during which there were three acts of
sexual intercourse and an act of oral-genital contact.28 7
Although the complainant contended that she yielded out of fear and
thus did not consent, the court found otherwise. It commented that it
was "not illegal to feed a girl a line, to continue the attempt, not to take
no for a final answer, at least not the first time." The court also noted
that the defendant "spurned the readily available ... [and] acquiescent
women" and "got his kicks through the exercise of these techniques."
As he boasted to the police, "this was a game he played with girls'
heads" as well as their bodies-a game that gave him pleasure and power
at the expense of women's victimization. While the court found this con-
duct "reprehensible," it was "not criminal"-it was only "conquest by
con job."28 8
284. Ibid., 551-52.
285. People v. Lifler, 275 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71-72 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
283 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1967).
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People v. Hughes,2"9 the second case, involved a runaway who was
staying in the defendant Hughes's apartment. When he returned one
evening at midnight and found her lying asleep nude in his bed, the
defendant undressed and got into bed with her, kissed her, and fondled
her, but, according to his testimony, did not have intercourse. Accord-
ing to the complainant, he attacked her with a knife, demanded sex, and,
despite her protests, forced her to relent. Later he pulled her hair,
choked her, and engaged in more intercourse. On these facts, plus the
additional one that her two male friends sleeping in the room with her
did not intervene because "they were afraid someone would get hurt,' ' 9tg
a jury found the defendant guilty, but the Appellate Division reversed,
apparently finding the testimony of both the defendant and the two other
men incredible.29' The likely interpretation of the facts by the court was
that the defendant and the complainant did have intercourse, but that
despite her protests, her posture made it legitimate for him "not to take
no for a final answer."
Another striking reversal occurred in the earlier case of People v.
Mahoney,292 in which the court invalidated a rape conviction by finding
lack of sufficient resistance on the part of a complainant who had been
the voluntary drinking companion of the defendant. Then there was Peo-
ple v. Brundage,293 in which the court found that, if an 11-year-old girl
was mature enough to be capable of resistance, her lack of resistance
would reduce a charge from first-degree to statutory rape. Finally, in
People v. Light,2 94 the court reversed a conviction because the complain-
ant, who had had intercourse not only with defendant but also with his
co-defendants, failed to give sufficient testimony that she had not con-
sented to the intercourse with him.
Of course, the courts were more likely to find lack of consent and
accordingly affirm convictions in cases of stranger rape, such as People v.
Yannucci,29 in which eight or nine men had dragged the complainant
into a shack and kept her there for three hours while they had inter-
course with her, and People v. Pelvino,29 6 in which the court found a
woman of the mental age of seven incapable of giving consent. Courts
also found lack of consent and therefore affirmed convictions in other
cases in which they neglected to spell out the evidence.297
289. 343 N.Y.S.2d 240 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1973), appeal dismissed, 374 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Ct. App.
1975).
290. Ibid., 241.
291. See ibid., 242-44 (majority and dissenting opinions).
292. 113 N.Y.S.2d 693 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1952).
293. 147 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1955).
294. 138 N.Y.S.2d.262 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1955).
295. 283 N.Y. 546.
296. 214 N.Y.S. 577 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1926).
297. See People v. Bercume, 329 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1972); People v. Liller, 275
N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 283 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1967);
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But when a woman was acquainted with a man with whom she had
had intercourse, mid-twentieth-century judges would tend to accept the
view of leading scholars that the woman's "hysterical personality" and
"efforts at being charming" had "arouse[d] erotic reactions," that the act
of intercourse was "brought on by her own provocation,"29 and that it
was therefore a product of her own consent. Judges believed that, even
when a woman said "no" to a man's demand for sex, in reality she often
meant "yes." Their understanding, moreover, reflected the era's popular
culture-a culture expressed, for example, in the lyrics of a song con-
tained in Mitch Miller's Sing Along with Mitch collection, declaring,
"Your Lips Tell Me No! No! But There's Yes! Yes! in Your Eyes."
299
Thus the holding of People v. Evans30° which is so inconsistent with
today's values 301 - that it was "not illegal" for a man seeking sex "to
continue the attempt [and] not to take no for a final answer" 3 2 - was
characteristic of its time.
3. The Victimization of Women
The doctrinal developments in the law of rape that have been consid-
ered in this section occurred at high cost to women and with little regard
to their right not to be compelled to engage in intercourse. The slight
regard in which judges held a woman's right of refusal was perhaps best
illustrated by two damage cases, one of which set aside as excessive a
$66,000 jury verdict on behalf of a 13-year-old rape victim, 3° 3 while the
other awarded a meager $5000 judgment for a 14-year-old victim. 3°4 It
was also reflected in the ancient rule that on account of the doctrine of
marital consent a husband could not be guilty of raping his wife.305
In the context of the double standard whereby a woman, as the "con-
People v. Warren, 261 N.Y.S.2d 217 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1965). Cases also dealt with the
admissibility of evidence: see People v. Dabney, 422 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979), rev'd,
438 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1981); People v. Wheeler, 377 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1975); People v. Bradley, 190 N.Y.S.2d 916 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1959). Other cases dealt with the
sufficiency of evidence. For a case holding evidence sufficient, see People v. Hutchings, 318
N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1971). For cases holding evidence insufficient, see People v.
Strong, 242 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1963), rev'g 236 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2d Dep't); People v.
Spruill, 248 N.Y.S.2d 931 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1964); People v. Conley, 87 N.Y.S.2d 745 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1949); People v. Czyz, 30 N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1941). For a case holding
evidence sufficient on one count and insufficient on another, see People v. Parker, 142 N.Y.S.2d 867
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1955).
298. Halleck, "Emotional Effects of Victimization," 675.
299. Cliff Friend, "There's Yes! Yesl in Your Eyes," in Sing Along with Mitch: The Mitch Miller
Family Songfest, A Treasury of Funtime Favorites, ed. Mitch Miller (New York: Random House,
1961), 67.
300. 379 N.Y.S.2d 912.
301. See Estrich, "Rape," Yale Law Journal 95 (1986): 1116-21.
302. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 922.
303. See Gallagher v. City of New York, 292 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1968).
304. See Foster v. State of New York, 292 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
305. See People v. Meli, 193 N.Y.S. 365, 366-67 (Sup. Ct. Chautauqua County 1922).
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troller of the sexual relation,' ' 3° was supposed to "say . . . 'no' [even]
when she mean[t] 'yes,' "307 date rape inevitably occurred in a "grey
area, "30 in which there was "no clear dividing line between physical
assault and sexuality.""a To use the criminal law in this context to pro-
tect a woman's right to say "no" would deprive men, as well as women
who meant "yes" when they said "no," of sexual opportunities that they
felt entitled to pursue. Even worse, the commonly held, mid-twentieth-
century view of male and female sexuality understood that, once a couple
had started to pursue the love and closeness that women were thought to
crave, actual intercourse became "a necessity to [the] man. 3 °10 In light of
this view, the grant to women of a legal power to terminate the "ritual,
... game, or... dance" of which "the consummation of sexuality [was]
an integral part" 311 would painfully deprive men not merely of an oppor-
tunity but even more of a satisfaction to which, in mid-century under-
standings, they were entitled.
New York judges, as the cases decided prior to the 1970s plainly show,
would not countenance the use of criminal law either to deprive men of
their sexual opportunities or to disappoint their sexual expectations. But
in protecting the rights of men, the judges trampled on the rights of
women. For what the mid-century law of date rape made clear was that,
once a woman became close to a man who demanded intercourse and
had the physical power to compel it, she could not refuse even if she did
not, in fact, consent. Even if the words "No! No!" passed from a
woman's lips, a man was free to assume that the woman's true desire-
"Yes! Yes!"-was reflected in her eyes. In accordance with such sexist
thought patterns of the 1960s, the law did nothing to obstruct men from
obtaining the sex they wanted, even though women did not always give
that sex freely. The protective attitude of the judiciary of the 1920s had,
in short, largely disappeared by the 1960s.
III. SOCIETAL REALITIES UNDERLYING DOCTRINAL CHANGE
A. Sexual Mores in World War II and the Postwar Suburbs
Underlying the dramatic doctrinal changes that had occurred by the
1960s in the law of sodomy, prostitution, family violence, pornography,
and rape were more fundamental social and economic changes that had
begun with the end of the Great Depression and the coming of World
306. Ira Reiss, Premarital Sexual Standards in America (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), 245.
Accord Winston Ehrmann, Premarital Dating Behavior (New York: Holt, 1959), 268.
307. Barbara Sichtermann, Femininity: The Politics of the Personal, ed. Helga Geyer-Ryan,
trans. John Whitlam (Minneapolis: Polity Press, 1986), 39.
308. Ibid., 33.
309. Ibid., 32.
310. D'Emilio and Freedman, Intimate Matters, 179 (emphasis in original). See also ibid., 267,
274.
311. Sichtermann, Femininity, 33.
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War II. The decade of the 1940s "changed... [people's] lifestyle and...
outlook," replacing the New Deal's aspiration for structural reforms that
would protect the weak and poor from social conditions they could not
control with a new faith, growing out of the revival of economic opportu-
nity, that people "could do things" by and for themselves.3" 2 Whereas
people during the Depression had been "radicalized" and "convinced of
the need for social change" because "the system as it was wasn't good
enough,"3 3 wartime culture had shown them that "problems are of an
individualistic nature" and that "the virtues and vices of the central"
actors rather than "social forces ... move[d] ... events along."3 4
The massive suburbanization of the postwar years reinforced the indi-
vidualistic assumptions that many Americans had developed during the
war. As nine million people migrated to the nation's newly constructed
suburbs in the decade after the war, the map of New York and the nation
was dramatically altered. Old ethnic neighborhoods in New York City
were depopulated and extended families torn apart as Italians, Jews, and
Scandinavians, for instance, became neighbors to each other. They and
their children became more important social influences on each other
than their families, their old communities, or their churches could be.
But the new neighbors would never have a dominant influence because,
as one observer has commented, the suburbs were much more private
and individualistic than the old neighborhoods had been. Suburban life
was focused inside the home around new entertainment forms such as
television, suburban homes opened outside into private back yards, and
suburbanites usually travelled to the outside world enclosed in
automobiles. In prewar city life, in contrast, homes had front porches
opening on the street, entertainment occurred in public places such as
movie theaters, and people got places on foot or by public transportation,
where they could not avoid meeting each other.31 5
As suburbanites pursued their individualistic economic opportunities
and private recreations, they no longer automatically accepted the values
of the groups, especially the neighborhoods, churches, and extended fam-
ilies, of which they had been a part. As essentially private individuals,
they had a choice of pursuing the lifestyles of their new neighbors or of
their more familiar groups, or of taking bits and portions from each.
They could yield publicly to pressures for suburban conformity on some
occasions while rejecting them privately on others. The result was that
312. Statement of James Covert, in The Homefront: America During World War II, ed. Mark J.
Harris, Franklin D. Mitchell, and Steven J. Schechter (New York: Putnam, 1984), 240. Accord
Statement of Laura Briggs, in ibid., 255. See also John Morton Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and
American Culture during World War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 12-13.
313. Statement of Henry Fiering, in The Homefront, ed. Harris, et al., 242.
314. Sherman H. Dryer, Radio in Wartime (New York: Greenberg, 1942), quoted in Blum, V
Was for Victory, 26.
315. See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 234-38, 278-82.
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much social practice changed. Some of the most striking, best docu-
mented, and most important changes related to issues of sexuality.
Dramatic changes had begun as early as 1940 with the enactment of
the first peacetime draft. They continued to escalate thereafter, as bur-
geoning war industries and the military did what the suburbs would later
do: they removed people from established communities and from the
traditional moral and social structures linked to them, and transposed
them into new, often transient groups, in which anonymity and the ever-
present horrors of war encouraged young people to indulge.316 The war,
in short, "provided an infinite variety of situations for the fulfillment...
of male sexual desires. ' 317 Here are three eye-witness reports:
Many things took place then because the men were being shipped
overseas. There were a lot of girls I knew in college who got caught
in that-let's make his last days here happy, just in case he never
comes back. I don't know how many had illegitimate children...
simply because they felt they owed it to this man because this might
be the last he'd ever have.318
Another indelible scene I remember was a startling sight on a
train. It was night and our train was slowly passing another. I
turned and looked, and there in the dimly lit car was [sic] a GI and a
woman having sex while several other GI's stood around watching
or not watching .... I could hardly believe what I had seen. You
took a deep breath and it was gone, yet it made a deep impression on
me. You knew everybody was going to get off the train at the next
stop, and that was the end of that. You were passing each other in
the night.319
I let a sailor pick me up and go all the way with me. I had inter-
course with him partly because he had a strong personal appeal for
me, but mainly because I had a feeling of high adventure and
because I wanted to please a member of the armed forces.32°
As one man named Roger Montgomery, who found himself involved in
sexual activities that were "totally new to me," reported, he was not "a
great lover in this situation, because ... I was frightened to death about
it a good deal of the time." Nonetheless, "for me it was quite a liberating
experience. ' 321 The same was undoubtedly true for a high school stu-
dent who lost his virginity with a woman of thirty whose husband was
overseas. "We weren't in love," he recalled, but the "times were condu-
316. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 24; D'Emilio and Freedman, Intimate Matters, 260; Allan
Berube, "Marching to a Different Drummer: Lesbian and Gay GIs in World War II," in Hidden
from History, ed. Duberman, et al., 383, 384-85.
317. Ehrmann, Premarital Dating, 70.
318. Statement of Virginia Rasmussen, in The Homefront, ed. Harris, et al., 172, 174-75.
319. Statement of Frances Veeder, in ibid., 175, 177.
320. Quoted in Ehrmann, Premarital Dating, 74.
321. Statement of Roger Montgomery, in The Homefront, ed. Harris, et al., 185, 186.
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cive for this sort of thing. 32 2 For another high school student working
in a war plant "full of working girls who were 'on the make,'... a male
war worker became the center of loose morality. It was a sex
paradise. "323
Gay women and men enjoyed similar experiences, as the same social
transformations that proved liberating for heterosexuals proved liberat-
ing for homosexuals as well. Gay GIs, who if they had been home could
never have "stay[ed] out all night or promote[d] a serious affair," since
their parents would have considered them "perverted" and kept them "in
the house," had "no one to answer to" in the army as long as they
"behave[d]" themselves "during the week and stay[ed] out of the way of
the MP's on weekends. '3 24 Since no one knew where they "might be
sent tomorrow," gay GIs did what young Americans in the military "did
with everything else," which "was take chances and risks and try to
enjoy things., 325 Those who wrote letters or kept diaries clearly did
enjoy things, as did one young man who "spent the nite in an empty
barracks... with the cutest thing you have ever seen.. .- and all was
wonderful. '326 Another man reported how his relationship with his
lover "was developing more beautifully than I ever dreamed possible,"
while "it seemed so good" to a third man that he and his lover developed
a lasting relationship.327 The war brought similar opportunities and
experiences to lesbians328 such as Lisa Ben, who, while sunbathing on the
roof of a Los Angeles rooming house populated by women, "got to talk-
ing," stated that she preferred to "go out strictly with girls," and later
was taken by her new friends to lesbian bars, where she "met lots of
girls.
329
During the war years, in short, the almost imperceptible changes that
had been occurring in sexual mores since the beginning of the century
coalesced into a qualitatively new and identifiable form. 33 0 "The net
impression" on a leading contemporary sociologist was "that war with its
accompanying increase in personal mobility, decrease in social controls,
increase in women working, and reorientations in life philosophies did
bring about an appreciable change. 33 1 People who had lived through
those years-and this is the important parallel between homosexual and
322. Quoted in Ehrmann, Premarital Dating, 73.
323. Quoted in ibid.
324. Quoted in Allan Berube, Coming Out under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in
World War Two (New York: Free Press, 1990), 98.
325. Quoted in ibid., 98.
326. Quoted in ibid., 102.
327. Quoted in ibid., 119.
328. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 27-30.
329. Quoted in ibid., 30 (emphasis in original).
330. See John D'Emilio, "Gay Politics and Community in San Francisco since World War II,"
in Hidden from History, ed. Duberman, et al., 456, 458.
331. Ehrmann, Premarital Dating, 75.
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heterosexual liberation during World War II-simply could not go back
to their old lifestyles encrusted by the old traditions. Thus, one veteran
was "afraid to return to Maysville," a small Kentucky town where he
could have no "gay life..., being as well known as I am," while another
remarked even more pointedly that he was "not going back to what I
left" because "it took me a long, long time to figure out how to enjoy
life." '332 Although a heterosexual like Roger Montgomery, who had
engaged in "liberating" promiscuity during the war, probably entered
marriage with an expectation of future monogamy, his earlier liberation
typically made him more tolerant of extramarital sex and promiscuity,
whether on his own part or on the part of others. Indeed, parents of the
1950s and 1960s were far more tolerant of their children than their par-
ents had been of them: they didn't keep their children "in the house"
when the teens and even pre-teens of the 1950s developed the practice of
"going steady. . .- a sort of play-marriage, a mimicry of the actual mar-
riage of their slightly older peers," which "implied greater sexual inti-
macy." '333 Perhaps they understood that their children were turning to
intimate relationships for the same reason they had: as an escape from
the competition, insecurity, and fear of the postwar era that "perpetuated
that classic wartime desire for something stable in an unstable world." '334
Thus the Second World War and the years that followed it produced
new realities and expectations with regard to sex. Some of the most
striking evidence for the change comes from Linda Gordon's study of
gender-related violence. Gordon reports that social workers in the 1930s
"did not accept the assumption that wives owed sexual availability to
their husbands, but retained a rather Victorian suspicion of male sexual
demands." In particular, they saw nothing wrong with wives demanding
money in return for sex and refused to condone male violence on grounds
of sexual deprivation. In the 1950s, in contrast, the "very complaints
that had previously been recorded as allegations of 'sexual excess' were
now rendered as evidence of female frigidity," and women who used
refusal of intercourse as a weapon to gain control of their husbands'
paychecks, or whose refusal led to violence, were condemned.335
When this new postwar ethic of sexual indulgence, especially for
males, 336 was conjoined to the era's individualistic assumptions, the
moral climate was transformed for everyone, including those who contin-
ued to abide by conventional standards. Strange and novel theories were
expounded for legitimating the varied sexual explorations on which indi-
viduals wished to embark. It was argued, for instance, "that the sexual
332. Quoted in Berube, Coming Out Under Fire, 244-45.
333. Beth L. Bailey, From Front Porch to Back Seat: Courtship in Twentieth-Century America
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 49, 51.
334. Ibid., 49.
335. Gordon, Heroes of their Own Lives, 269-70.
336. See D'Emilio and Freedman, Intimate Matters, 262-64.
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restrictions imposed by contemporary societies . ..are excessive and
harmful to the mental health of the individual" and that the "institutions
of society should be so organized so as to foster the release of sexual-
ity." '337 Drawing on the individualistic rhetoric of "rights" used by Pres-
ident Roosevelt to exhort Americans to victory in World War I1,338 those
seeking sexual liberty typically cast their demands in the language of
"rights" 339 and, in the case of gay men and lesbians, tried to portray
themselves as "minorities" entitled to special legal solicitude.34 In par-
ticular, those searching for sexual freedom repeatedly advanced the argu-
ment initially formulated by John Stuart Mill a century earlier that "the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any mem-
ber of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others"; power could not be exercised over a person for his own moral
good or "because in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or
even right."34' As reported in the popular press, the American Law
Institute agreed: in its Model Penal Code, the ALI adopted the view that
the law should not " 'attempt to use the power of the state to enforce
purely moral or religious standards,'" since it was " 'inappropriate for
the Government to attempt to control behavior that has no substantial
significance except as to the morality of the actor.' "342 An individual's
choice of sexual fulfillment, in short, was recognized by the ALI and
others as a guaranteed private right and an essential part of the atmos-
phere of "human freedom" which distinguished life in the United States
from the sort of "monolithic totalitarian enslavement" that existed in
much of the rest of the world.343
As years went on, unconventional minorities would demand more,
however, than merely their freedom and their rights: they would demand
respect for the lifestyles they led. More importantly, as increasing num-
bers of otherwise conventional individuals continued to violate sexual
norms, it became harder to deny that respect. As we have seen, sexual
repression before the war depended on the maintenance of a gap between
cultural leaders and those who violated sexual norms-a gap that made
the violators seem evil and inferior. But when one's best friend was dis-
covered in an affair with one's next door neighbor, when the teenage
337. Reuben Fine, "Psychoanalytic Theory of Sexuality," in Sexual Behavior and the Law, ed.
Slovenko, 147, 152-53.
338. See "An Economic Bill of Rights," 11 January 1944, in Documents ofAmerican History, ed.
Henry Steele Commager, 8th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), 2:483, 484-85.
339. Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths. Keywords in American Politics since Independence
(New York: Basic Books, 1987), 217-22.
340. See, for example, Berube, Coming Out under Fire, 228-54.
341. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Currin V. Shields (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956),
13.
342. "The Law: Sin & Criminality," Time Magazine, 30 May 1955, p. 13, col. 1, quoting an
unspecified ALI source.
343. James Burnham, "Rhetoric and Peace," Partisan Review 17 (1950): 861, 870.
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daughter of the town bank's president became pregnant, or when the
high school valedictorian joined a gay or lesbian community in New
York or San Francisco after graduation from college, the gap could no
longer be maintained. The violators were now too much like oneself or
one's children and, however much one might abhor their specific miscon-
duct, it was impossible to treat them as nonpersons and deny them all
respect. As "vast numbers in the community, including the otherwise
most respectable," ceased to adhere to the traditional "standard of sexual
conduct," a moral crisis and an "acute problem ... for the administra-
tion of criminal justice" arose,3 and demands for decriminalization of
sexual "misconduct" grew.
There were also two other reasons for decriminalizing sexual "immo-
rality." The first was the tendency of the police to enforce morals legisla-
tion arbitrarily and unequally. Those favoring decriminalization
recognized that "most... American legislation against sexual immoral-
ity" was already a "dead ... letter," but they did not "contemplate this
situation with complacency." Their concern was that "the existence of
criminal laws which are generally not enforced places formidable dis-
criminatory powers in the hands of the police and prosecuting authori-
ties,"34 and that police and prosecutorial discretion was "unlikely to be
exercised in any but an arbitrary kind of way" accompanied by "unsa-
vory methods" of enforcement.'" In a widely publicized speech in sup-
port of decriminalization of sex offenses, Judge Learned Hand summed
up the argument by observing that "'[c]riminal law which is not
enforced practically is much worse than if it was not on the books at
all.' ,,347 "[R]eliance upon the criminal law ... [i]n the case of morals
offenses" had "reduce[d] the criminal law's essential claim to legitimacy
by inducing offensive and degrading police conduct," had "fostered
organized criminality and ha[d] produced, possibly, more crime than it
ha[d] suppressed. ' 348
The final argument for decriminalization was the law's ineffectiveness.
To the extent that people continued to understand certain practices as
deviations from acceptable sexual behavior, they also came to the view
that criminal punishment and the threat of punishment would not alter
behavior. By the 1960s psychiatry rather than law seemed the most
fruitful way to address matters of sexuality. Thus, a book published in
that decade, entitled Sexual Behavior and the Law, was authored by
344. Sanford H. Kadish, "The Crisis of Overcriminalization," Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 374 (1967): 157, 160.
345. H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 27.
346. Packer, Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 287.
347. "The Law: Sin & Criminality," Time Magazine, 30 May 1955, p. 13, col. 2, quoting speech
of Learned Hand at ALI meeting considering proposal of Model Penal Code to decriminalize sex
offenses.
348. Kadish, "Crisis of Overcriminalization," 157.
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thirty-seven psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, medical doctors, and social
workers compared to only six lawyers, and contained over two hundred
pages on such topics as the "Psychoanalytic Theory of Sexuality" and
the "Psychodynamics of Sexual Deviations and the Law." '349
Although judges and other legal decisionmakers paid heed to the lib-
eral demand for decriminalization of at least victimless sex crimes, they
did not yield to the demand completely because it was counterbalanced
by a new conservative opposition seeking to preserve established tradi-
tions and the established order. Thus, virtually every group seeking new
rights or equality in the late 1940s and 1950s met with opposition and
repression. Teens exploiting their new sexual freedoms, for example, met
with substantial resistance from parents,350 while gays met with outright
discrimination, including an executive order by President Eisenhower
barring them as security risks from all federal employment. 35 1 On a
more theoretical plane, Judge John J. Parker argued that at least some
victimless sex offenses ought to be "'denounced by the criminal code in
order that society may know that the state disapproves.' 352 Proposals
for the abandonment of traditional norms, among which were those gov-
erning sexual behavior, were met again and again with the response, to
quote Thomas E. Dewey's 1944 running mate, that "insidious and omi-
nous ... forces of communism linked with irreligion .. .are worming
their way into national life ... and will destroy the very foundations of
the Republic. ' 35 3 Conservatives everywhere, even on the bench, were
ready to resist what they viewed as the forces of evil and to fight for the
preservation of morality and the republic.
B. The New Feminism and Sexuality
Conservatives alone, however, could not halt the tendency toward
decriminalization of sex offenses and gender-related violence.
Decriminalization slowed only when feminists started to complain about
the harm it was doing to women and began to demand redress.
With the 1963 publication of Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mys-
tique,35 4 the 1964 passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, with its
goal of equal employment opportunities for women, and the 1965 found-
ing of NOW, the National Organization for Women, a new feminist
movement was born.355 In its earliest incarnation in the mid-1960s, the
349. See Sexual Behavior and the Law, ed. Slovenko, vii-xiv, 147-70, 397-608.
350. See Baily, From Front Porch to Back Seat, 51-55.
351. See Berube, Coming Out under Fire, 265-70.
352. "The Law: Sin & Criminality," Time Magazine, 30 May 1955, p. 13, col. 1, quoting speech
of John J. Parker at meeting of ALI considering proposal of Model Penal Code to decriminalize sex
offenses.
353. Senator John Bricker, quoted in Blum, V Was for Victory, 297.
354. Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: Norton, 1963).
355. See Sarah Evans, Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights
Movement and the New Left (New York: Knopf, 1979), 18-19.
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new movement seemed unconcerned with the issues of criminal law on
which this essay focuses. But concerns about rape, family violence, por-
nography, and prostitution soon appeared in the late-1960s writings of
more radical feminists. These concerns became an important part of the
movement for women's liberation that was solidly in place by 1970 and
remains perhaps the most potent political and social force in American
public life today.
Although "the ideological complexity of the movement is too great to
be categorized so simply, '35 6 with disagreement over a myriad of issues
ranging from the structures that should be adopted for the internal gov-
ernance of women's groups, through the significance to be attached to
lines of race and class, to the proper place of lesbian sexuality in a future
feminist utopia,357 some rough categorization of feminist ideology is
essential in order to retain a focus on the main subjects of this article.
However much women may have disagreed on other issues, their think-
ing about the law of rape, pornography, prostitution, and gender-related
violence tended to fit into three main categories during the decade of the
1970s.
In the first category were thinkers who believed that women are essen-
tially the same as men, that gender inequality resulted from arbitrary
legal distinctions, and that with the elimination of those distinctions "the
human qualities of male and female will merge in a new image of the
ideal person."3 Betty Friedan, the author of The Feminine Mystique
and the founder of the National Organization for Women, exemplified
this liberal version of feminism. In Friedan's view, "[t]he only way for a
woman, as for a man, to find herself ... is by creative work."3 9 Women
"'need competition just like men do,'" and "must learn to compete...
not as... wom[e]n, but as ... human being[s]." 3" Accordingly, the goal
of NOW was "'to bring women into full participation in the mainstream
of American society ... in truly equal partnership with men.'" Friedan
never saw "women, as an oppressed class, fighting to overthrow or take
power away from men as a class, the oppressors"; she hoped men would
"be part of" NOW and that the movement for women's rights would
"include men as equal members. 3 61 She wanted to put an end to the
world in which women had to "'adjust' to prejudice and discrimina-
tion," but she did not intend to create a world in which a woman should
356. Jo Freeman, The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social
Movement and its Relation to the Policy Process (New York: McKay, 1975), 51.
357. For a detailed analysis of the divisions in feminism in the years around 1970, see generally
Alice Echols, Daring to be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1979 (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1989).
358. Janet Z. Giele, Women and the Future: Changing Sex Roles in Modern America (New
York: Free Press, 1978), 360.
359. Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 10th Anniv. ed. (New York: Norton, 1973), 344.
360. Ibid., 374, quoting remarks of N.Y. State Assemblywoman Dorothy Bell Lawrence.
361. Ibid., 384, quoting Statement of Purpose of National Organization for Women.
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"expect special privileges because of her sex." ' 362 Many other women
thinkers have joined with Friedan in finding "more similarity than differ-
ence in the traits ... [of] each sex" and in modelling gender relationships
in accordance with "an image of human wholeness" involving "'a spirit
of reconciliation between the sexes,' " leaving both with the "capacity for
a 'full range of experience.' "363
The second, more radical branch of feminists did "not believe that
women should be integrated into the male world so that they can be 'just
as good as men,' " nor did they "believe that the oppression of women"
would "be ended by giving them a bigger piece of the pie, as Betty
Friedan would have it." On the contrary, they believed that "the pie
itself is rotten. ' ' 361 Unlike the liberals, the radicals did "not see equality
as a proper, or sufficient, or moral, or honorable final goal" for women;
the ultimate goal of radical feminism was to force "men ... to renounce
their phallocentric personalities, and the privileges and powers given to
them at birth as a consequence of their anatomy, . . . [and] to excise
everything in them that they now value as distinctively 'male.' "365
The central fact on which radical feminists based their analysis was the
fundamental "split between the two primary cultures of the world-the
female culture and the male culture. ' 366 It seemed clear to the radicals
that cultural forces were "set by men, presenting only the male view,"
and that women were thereby "kept from achieving an authentic picture
of their reality. '367 Thus, the goal for many radicals was to "eradicate
the sexual division on which our society is based. ' 368 These radicals
wanted "a cultural revolution, which, while it must necessarily involve
.. political and economic reorganization... must go far beyond this as
well" to include "true re-education," the elimination of "sex [a]s a status
category with political implications," '369 and the destruction of "oppres-
sive power structures set up by Nature and reinforced by man."3 7 At
least in regard to issues of rape, prostitution, pornography, and gender-
362. Ibid., 374.
363. Giele, Women and the Future, 327, 351, quoting Carolyn G. Heilbrun, Toward a
Recognition of Androgyny (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), x. For a survey of the literature
written prior to 1978 in support of this assimilationist view, see Giele, 325-28, 350-60.
364. Bonnie Kreps, "Radical Feminism 1," in Radical Feminism, ed. Anne Koedt, Ellen Levine,
and Anita Rapone (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), 234, 239.
365. Andrea Dworkin, Our Blood- Prophecies and Discourses on Sexual Politics (New York:
Harper & Row, 1976), 11, 13.
366. Barbara Burris, "The Fourth World Manifesto," in Radical Feminism, ed. Koedt, et al.,
322, 341.
367. Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York:
Morrow, 1970), 178. See also Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970),
232.
368. Kreps, "Radical Feminism 1," 239.
369. Millett, Sexual Politics, 24, 362-63.
370. Firestone, Dialectic of Sex, 16. On the opposition of Friedan and other feminists, who saw
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related violence, the ultimate goal of radical feminists was to make every
man appreciate that every woman is "a complex human being with a self-
interest not identical with his ' 371 and to compel men to give women's
interests priority, even when they conflicted with the interests of men.
The third group of women thinkers in the 1970s, typified by Phyllis
Schlafly, agreed with the second group that there were "fundamental dif-
ference[s] ' 372 between men and women both in regard to "sexual drive"
and to "emotional and psychological" matters.373 However, the differ-
ences between man and woman, according to Schlafly, did "not in any
sense make her inferior",;374 on the contrary, women in America had
been "'exalted'" and granted "a status ... unknown in the rest of the
world. 375 "It [was] on ... women that... civilization depend[ed], 376
Schlafly wrote. For this reason, women in the third group opposed the
liberation agendas of those in the first two, since liberation of women
would drive them from a position of" 'superiority to equality.' ,,377 They
also opposed women's liberation as an attack on marriage, the home, and
the family.378
These three different approaches on the part of women in the late
1960s and the 1970s produced some significant divergences of opinion on
issues of sexual morality. Although all women found rape and male vio-
lence against women and children abhorrent, disagreement emerged over
prostitution and, especially, pornography. Liberals like Friedan who
found men and women essentially the same believed that women should
have equal sexual liberty with men. Thus, it was possible for at least
some feminist writers to recognize that "pornography is not a homogen-
ized discourse expressing only women's oppression"; in the view of one
author, "[m]ultiple meanings coexist within pornography," including
both "fantasy and rebellion," which "can be experienced as a liberating
feeling" by many women.379 Likewise, a woman judge could object to
the prosecution of women for prostitution on the ground that such prose-
cutions rested on "archaic notions that a woman's place is in the nar-
rowly circumscribed, nonpublic world" and that women have no
business "wander[ing] out of this protective sphere into the public" and
"self-determin[ing] to whom and when they shall bestow their 'sexual
371. Firestone, Dialectic of Sex, 184.




375. Ibid., 30, 33, quoting statement of Rose Totino, Vice President of Pillsbury Co.
376. Ibid., 139.
377. Ibid., 30, quoting statement of Rose Totino, Vice President of Pillsbury Co.
378. See ibid., 54, 159-63. See also Rayna Rapp and Ellen Ross, "The 1920s: Feminism,
Consumerism, and Political Backlash in the United States," in Women in Culture and Politics: A
Century of Change, ed. Judith Friedlander, et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 52.
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favors.' ",380 In this judge's view, a woman, whether a prostitute or not,
should have the same right as a man to engage in "private consensual
sexual conduct.
381
In contrast, both the radical feminists and women like Phyllis Schlafly
associated with the new right adopted positions opposed to both pornog-
raphy and prostitution. For many radicals, their opposition grew out of
their perspective on the "sexual act" itself, which, as they saw it, con-
ferred "the feeling of power and prestige for the male, [and] of impotence
and submission for the female."' 382 For radicals, sexual intercourse and
violence represented "act[s] of freedom and strength" for "the male pop-
ulation, ' 38 3 whereas for the "class of women," they constituted "a
strange lesson" in "the objective, innate and unchanging subordination of
women relative to men ."384 Especially "[i]n rape, the emotions of aggres-
sion, hatred, contempt, and the desire to break or violate personality,
[took] a form consummately appropriate to sexual politics."'385 Radical
feminist theory thus demanded not only the reform of the law governing
rape and gender-oriented violence-a reform with which virtually all
women agreed-but also a thoroughgoing and much more problematic
reconstitution of sexual habits and values.
For the radicals, the existence of pornography was linked closely to
rape and gender violence. They began to "make the connections between
media violence to women and real-life violence to them" and to recognize
that while it was necessary to "deal directly with acute.., problems like
rape and wife-beating," it was equally important to "remove the images
which promote a climate in which these crimes are possible.", 386 In their
view, "pornography is the ideology of a culture which promotes and con-
dones rape, woman-battering, and other crimes of violence against
women," 387 all of which "'involve the acting out of male power over,
and often hatred toward, women.' "388
Prostitution raised similar concerns. One connection between pornog-
raphy and prostitution was the ease with which pornography models
became prostitutes-by, for instance, engaging in " 'simulated sex'-even
sometimes when it's not simulated." As one model argued, both pornog-
380. In re P., 400 N.Y.S.2d 455, 461 n.II (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1977) (opinion of Margaret
Taylor, J.), rev'd, 418 N.Y.S.2d 597 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1979).
381. Ibid., 468.
382. Barbara Mehrof and Pamela Kearon, "Rape: An Act of Terror," in Radical Feminism, ed.
Koedt, et al., 228, 229.
383. Ibid., 233.
384. Ibid., 230 (emphasis in original).
385. Millett, Sexual Politics, 44.
386. Laura Lederer, "Introduction," in Take Back the Night: Women on Pornography, ed. Laura
Lederer (New York: Morrow, 1980), 16.
387. Ibid., 19-20.
388. Ibid., 17, quoting Dianna E.H. Russell, "Pornography: A Feminist Perspective," in
unidentified source. For further radical critiques of pornography, see Andrea Dworkin, Woman
Hating (New York: Dutton, 1974), 51-90; and MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, 127-213.
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raphy and prostitution were "all a form of rape because the women who
are involved in it don't know how to get out."3 89 As another radical
argued in testimony to a committee of the New York Legislature consid-
ering whether to recognize prostitution as a victimless crime, women
were its victims. "[W]omen with ambition" were victims because they
had to "sell their bodies" in order to earn an independent living.3ag As
the witness continued,
There was a time when I was an unemployed actress, and working
to support myself as a waitress and a file clerk. The disparity
between my reality situation and my ambition for a better life was so
great that I gave serious consideration to the social pressure to do a
little hustling. And that is something, gentlemen, I really don't
think that you comprehend. I don't think that anyone has ever
asked you to sell your body, or presumed that your body was for
sale. I wonder if a cab driver has ever turned around to you and
remarked, "I see you're a little short of change. Perhaps we could
work together. I could steer some customers your way." I wonder
if a man has ever walked up to you in a hotel lobby, and muttered,
"What's your price? Ten? Twenty? I'll pay it. I'll pay it." That
happened to me in the Hotel Astor. I wonder if you've ever applied
for work in a bar-restaurant, and the owner, or perhaps he was only
the manager, looked you up and down and said, "Are you sure
you're over twenty-one? Why don't you come downstairs with me
and prove it?" . . . It is women who are being harassed on these
streets in New York City, day and night, and they are being
harassed by men and not the reverse. Yes, there is a prostitution
problem, and it is expressed by... [men] who daydream ... about
women in clean little stalls, medically approved and at a price a
workingman can afford.391
The existence of prostitution thus reflected "a serious problem"-that
men found "access to the female body.. ., if not a divine right, at least a
monetary right"-and this serious problem would prevent women from
being "equals until there's an end to prostitution. 3 92
In their challenges to the law of rape, sexual violence, pornography,
and prostitution, as that law existed at the outset of the 1970s, the radical
feminists took a stand remarkably close to that of the new right, with its
opposition to the alleged "liberation of the new morality"-a morality
which the new right, like the radicals, saw as "a cheat and a thief." In
speaking for the right, Phyllis Schlafly in fact echoed many themes from
389. Laura Lederer, "Then and Now: An Interview with a Former Pornography Model," in
Take Back the Night, ed. Lederer, 57, 64.
390. Susan Brownmiller, "Speaking Out on Prostitution," in Radical Feminism, ed. Koedt, et
al., 72, 76.
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the radical left as she urged that the new morality "rob[bed] the woman
of her virtue, her youth, her beauty, and her love-for nothing, just noth-
ing. '' 393 Of course, the new right and the radical left differed sharply in
their assessments of the institution of marriage, with the right viewing it
as the ultimate protection for women, and the left, as the ultimate
oppression.394 But the two extremes were able to march toward the same
ends, together with virtually all women, with regard to rape and family
violence, and with each other on the issues of pornography and prostitu-
tion. When the right and the left marched together, significant political
pressure for change in the law of prostitution and pornography emerged,
and when all women stood in solidarity, important changes occurred in
legal doctrine making it easier to criminally prosecute male perpetrators
of rape and violence. In response to new ideas from women, the story of
sex crimes in the 1970s thus would be the reversal of the trend of the
1950s and 1960s toward decriminalization. It would even bring about
the reemergence of judicial support for vigorous criminal prosecution.
IV. THE RECRIMINALIZATION OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
A. Rape
In response to feminist demands whose legitimacy went virtually
unchallenged, fundamental doctrinal change occurred in the law of rape.
One area of change during the second half of the 1970s was in judicial
attitudes toward the doctrine of consent. Judges in these years contin-
ued, of course, to find lack of consent and to affirm convictions without
specifying the evidence, 395 as well as to hold that intercourse with men-
tally retarded women amounted to rape.396 The marked change came in
what would come to be conceptualized as date rape cases, especially
those in which women claimed that they had yielded, out of fear of being
seriously hurt, to men who were larger and stronger. After 1975, the
appellate courts, contrary to the spirit of the earlier cases, uniformly
affirmed the convictions that came before them, ruling that submission to
larger and stronger men did not constitute consent 397 and, therefore, that
men did have to "take no for a final answer." Indeed, post-1975 cases
held that even a prostitute could complain of rape when her customer
failed to pay her fee,398 and that a man could be convicted of first-degree
393. Schlafly, Power of the Positive Woman, 16.
394. See Eisenstein, Female Body and the Law, 4, 70-73, 164.
395. See People v. Hadden, 410 N.Y.S.2d 375 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1978); People v. Moore, 410
N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1978).
396. See People v. Easley, 396 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1977); People v. Dixon, 412 N.Y.S.2d 42
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1978).
397. See People v. Ayers, 410 N.Y.S.2d 377 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1978); People v. Bianchi, 391
N.Y.S.2d 29 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1977); People v. Vicaretti, 388 N.Y.S.2d 410, 414-15 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1976).
398. See People v. Gonzalez, 409 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
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sexual abuse when, over his date's protests, he partially disrobed her and
placed his hand on her breasts and other intimate parts while his co-
defendant forced her to touch his penis.3 99
Another dramatic change in the law of rape occurred quickly as a
result of legislation enacted in 1975. Until that time, the settled rule was
that evidence showing that a complainant had engaged in sexual inter-
course with the defendant or other men prior and/or subsequent to the
alleged rape was admissible to prove the complainant's consent;400 the
rule's effect, in the view of women's advocates, was to make it virtually
impossible for women with histories of sexual relations outside of mar-
riage to bring complaints in rape cases. In that year the legislature by
statute excluded evidence of a victim's sexual activities with anyone other
than the defendant, unless the evidence rebutted certain specific evidence
introduced by the district attorney, showed the victim to have been con-
victed of prostitution within three years of the alleged rape, or was found
by the court "to be relevant and admissible in the interests of justice."'"
The statute was received favorably by the courts and applied routinely
with statements that a "complainant's prior sexual history is not relevant
and should be excluded." 2 The statute was even applied retroactively
in trials begun after, but concerning crimes allegedly committed before,
its passage. °3
Perhaps the most important change occurred in the reversal of the
rule, originally adopted in the English and Radunovic cases, requiring
corroboration of a victim's testimony in order to obtain a conviction for
rape or any lesser included offense under circumstances in which a rape
had actually occurred. In view of the perversity of the English/Radu-
novic rule, it is not surprising that some courts had always tried to avoid
its consequences. One court held, for instance, that, although a jury
should be instructed that corroboration was required on a charge of
assault with intent to commit rape, the interests of justice required that a
conviction not be reversed when the defendant had failed to object to an
erroneous instruction.' Other judges held that, in the absence of cor-
roboration, a defendant who had intercourse with his daughter could be
convicted of incest, a crime for which corroboration was not required;" 5
399. Bianchi, 391 N.Y.S.2d 29, 30.
400. See People v. Thompson, 212 N.Y. 249 (1914); Woods v. People, 55 N.Y. 515 (1874);
People v. Hornbeck, 101 N.Y.S.2d 182 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1950); People v. Oathout, 265 N.Y.S.
535 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1933).
401. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992).
402. People v. Bronson, 419 N.Y.S.2d 329, 330 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979).
403. See People v. Patno, 390 N.Y.S.2d 468, 470 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1977); People v. Conyers,
382 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439-41 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976), affid, 405 N.Y.S.2d 409 (App. Div. ist
Dep't 1978).
404. See People v. Palmer, 274 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1966), affid, 342 N.Y.S.2d
377 (Ct. App. 1973).
405. See People v. Telles, 243 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963).
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that a defendant charged with both rape and robbery could be convicted
of robbery without corroboration;4" and that a defendant charged with
both rape and sodomy could be convicted of an assault with intent to
commit sodomy, since conviction could be had without corroboration for
forcible sodomy."' A defendant could also be convicted without corrob-
oration of the crime of sexual abuse in the third degree if he had commit-
ted only that crime," as by placing his hands on the private parts of a
nine-year-old girl' or by exposing himself and inviting two young girls
to feel his private parts,410 but not if he had actually consummated sexual
intercourse.41'
Within a few years of its decision in Radunovic, a changing majority of
the Court of Appeals also began to pull back from its holding in that
case. Under growing objections, the court now observed that the corrob-
oration requirement was "of minuscule practical value" and produced
"disconcerting, if not mischievous consequences." The rule "frustrate[d]
the prosecution of an inherently furtive act," "establishe[d] a system of
false distinctions between offenses" against women, created a "'motiva-
tion for falsehood,' " and "expresse[d] almost an irrational doubt toward
the claims of women who ha[d] been victimized sexually." '412 In
response to concerns such as these, the legislature between 1972 and
1975 enacted a series of piecemeal statutory changes 1 3 that ultimately
left New York with a corroboration requirement only in cases of consen-
sual sodomy and in cases of sex offenses against children too young or
others too incapacitated to appreciate the significance of the crimes
against them and thus either to give their consent or to provide reliable
testimony.414
The courts reacted positively to the new legislation and in appropriate
instances held that corroboration was no longer required for convictions
of rape and sexual abuse. 41 5 Even in cases in which corroboration was
possibiy required, the courts required far less evidence than they had
406. See People v. Jenkins, 291 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1968); People v. Lennon, 291 N.Y.S.2d
369 (Ct. App. 1968). But see People v. Scruggs, 298 N.Y.S.2d 194 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1969)
(defendant charged with rape and burglary could not be convicted of burglary without corroboration
if the breaking and entering had occurred with an intent to commit rape).
407. See People v. McCullough, 280 N.Y.S.2d 931, 933-34 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1967) (dissenting
opinion).
408. See In re Byron D., 320 N.Y.S.2d 467 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1971); People v. Doyle, 300
N.Y.S.2d 719, 727 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1969), affid, 309 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Ct. App. 1970).
409. People v, DeFrancesco, 273 N.Y.S.2d 770, 772-73 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966).
410. People v. Nisoff, 369 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Ct. App. 1975).
411. See Byron D., 320 N.Y.S.2d 467; Doyle, 300 N.Y.S.2d 719, 727.
412. People v. Linzy, 335 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47-48 (Ct. App. 1972), quoting concurring opinion of
Breitel, J., in Radunovic, 287 N.Y.S.2d 33, 38.
413. See William C. Donnino, "Practice Commentaries" to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16
(McKinney 1987).
414. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16 (McKinney 1987).
415. See People v. Weyant, 419 N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979); In re David M., 403
N.Y.S.2d 178 (Fam. Ct. Bronx County 1978).
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demanded before the legislation's passage. Thus, in People v. Fuller,4 16
the Court of Appeals held that medical evidence that a ten-year-old's
hymen was gone, together with a redness at the entrance to the vagina
consistent with, though not necessarily produced by, a recent act of inter-
course, corroborated the girl's claim that a man with whom her mother
was living in a common-law relationship had raped her. Similarly, in
People v. St. John ,417 a divorced father was convicted of sexually abusing
his two daughters, aged nine and seven, as well as a friend of the daugh-
ters, at a time prior to his divorce. The only evidence corroborating the
girls' claims of sexual touching was the father's admissions that they had
once seen him "exposed" and that on one occasion he had brushed urine
off his daughter's friend and on another checked to see if his daughter
had wet the bed, together with an earlier statement to his wife of "his
intention to break the kids in and have intercourse with them ... before
they started menstruation.'"418 On this evidence the court sustained two
counts of the defendant's conviction. And in other cases, the courts held
that evidence of vaginal intercourse corroborated a claim of forcible sod-
omy 4 19 and that semen on a girl's panties corroborated a charge of
rape.420 They also returned to the pre-1950 rule permitting the introduc-
tion of evidence of similar crimes to provide corroboration of the crime
charged.421
Thus, the statutory changes in the corroboration requirements carried
out in the 1970s completely flipped over the law's formal values on the
subject of rape. A system that had been gradually emerging for a quarter
century, with the object of preventing the entrapment of pleasure-seeking
men, though often at devastating cost to the women and children who
provided the pleasure, was suddenly and surprisingly transformed into a
system calculated to prevent victimization, though at the risk of subject-
ing innocent men to "the mercy" of "designing" women.4 22 In regard to
the law of corroboration, traditional moral values and newer feminist
ones triumphed completely.
A final line of cases during the late 1970s which displayed the law's
protective attitude toward women, as well as toward traditional moral
values, dealt with the claim that New York's rape laws were unconstitu-
tional because they discriminated against men. One alleged deficiency
was that the laws made only men subject to conviction as principals for
forcible rape; the courts, however, upheld this distinction as constitu-
416. 431 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1980).
417. 426 N.Y.S.2d 863 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980).
418. Ibid., 864-65.
419. See People v. DeBerry, 429 N.Y.S.2d 268 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1980).
420. See People v. Brown, 413 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979).
421. See People v. Grady, 413 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Albany County Ct. 1979).
422. People v. Yannucci, 15 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1939) (dictum), rev'd on
other grounds, 283 N.Y. 546 (1940).
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tional on the ground that only men were physiologically capable of com-
mitting the crime of rape.423 The second claim of unconstitutionality
arose in the context of the statutory rape laws, which barred men over 21
and 18 from engaging in sexual intercourse with women under 17 and 14
respectively.
People v. Whidden,424 which came to the same result as earlier lower
court cases,4 25 upheld the laws. One obvious justification for the legisla-
tion, found by the Court of Appeals to be "ample," was the prevention of
pregnancy.426 A second alleged justification "was to protect the morals
of young girls ... even from their own immature indiscretions"4 27 as well
as to protect them from "psychological" damage.428 Judges found
"[a]dolescence ... a period of... emotional turbulence," a time when
young girls are "subject to a variety of emotional and psychological
wants which can often be exploited by an 'older man,' "429 and they
therefore understood statutory rape laws as a protection against exploita-
tion and victimization. The Court of Appeals, however, found this justi-
fication unconstitutional, since it was "rooted" in the "stereotypical" and
"unfounded assumption that underage women are more vulnerable to
emotional harm than are their male counterparts.
430
The statutory and case law developments discussed in this section
completely overturned the policy direction of the law of rape in a mere
ten-year period. At the beginning of the 1970s, a woman who had inter-
course with a man with whom she was acquainted was presumed to have
given consent, her testimony was deemed untrustworthy in the absence
of corroboration, and her chastity became an issue if she made a legal
complaint. In any case resting solely on the testimony of a man and
woman who had engaged in intercourse, the man would thus be acquit-
ted of a rape charge, especially if the woman had had prior sexual experi-
ence. By 1980, in contrast, chastity was no longer an issue, formal legal
doctrine no longer presumed consent, and a man could be convicted of
rape solely on a woman's testimony; in any case of uncorroborated inter-
course, the man would be without defense and would go to prison if the
woman could convince a jury that he had raped her. The doctrinal infer-
423. See People v. Davoli, 407 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Onondaga County Ct. 1978); People v. Reilly, 381
N.Y.S.2d 732, 738 (Westchester County Ct. 1976).
424. 434 N.Y.S.2d 936 (Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981).
425. See People v. Dozier, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), affid, 436 N.Y.S.2d 620
(Ct. App. 1980); People v. Mndange-Pfupfu, 411 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Tompkins County Ct. 1978);
People v. Weidiger, 410 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Oneida County Ct. 1978); People v. Fauntleroy, 405
N.Y.S.2d 931 (Westchester County Ct. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 424 N.Y.S.2d 736 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1980).
426. Whidden, 434 N.Y.S.2d 936, 938.
427. Weidiger, 410 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211.
428. Mndange-Pfupfu, 411 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1005.
429. Dozier, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014-15 (emphasis added).
430. Whidden, 434 N.Y.S.2d 936, 938.
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iority of women was thus transformed into a position of theoretical legal
superiority.
Of course, the social effects of this doctrinal change were far less trans-
forming. Just as most men at the outset of the 1970s did not rape their
dates even though the law did not stand in their way, so too most men
who committed date rape at the decade's close were never brought to
trial. Custom and social practice were at both times more determinative
of sexual behavior than the law. Nonetheless, by undermining the power
of men to coerce sex from women and by instead giving women at least a
theoretical capacity to send their lovers to jail, the doctrinal upheaval in
the law of rape amounted to a powerful symbolic statement in support of
new attitudes widely shared by nearly all women and even many men.
B. Family Violence
Acting again in conjunction with tradition-minded conservatives, fem-
inists won another victory when they succeeded in obtaining judicial and
legislative support for the recriminalization of acts of family violence.
The first steps were taken by conservative judges, when they began to
halt the extension of the Family Court Act's conciliation and treatment
provisions to men and women who were living together without the ben-
efit of a formal marriage. These judges could not understand how the
goal of the Family Court Act, which was the " 'restoration and preserva-
tion of marriages,' " could be accomplished by providing assistance to
" 'persons who are living in a meretricious relationship.' "431 To assist
such people would "make the court a party ... to an immoral relation-
ship," would "impair the . . . morals" of children, and "would not
change the moral atmosphere generated by these people living together
under one roof.' 432
When the issue first came before the Court of Appeals, it ruled that, if
parties had contracted a common-law marriage in a state which recog-
nized the legality of such marriages and had subsequently moved to New
York, then their relationship would "qualif[y] for treatment as a spousal
or family relationship" under the Family Court Act.433 But the majority
would go no further. In the leading case of People v. Allen,43 4 in which
Judges Bergan and Fuld in dissent were prepared to extend decriminal-
ization to a case of a man who had committed an act of sodomy on a
woman with whom he had lived unmarried for three years, Judge Jasen
writing for the majority halted the decriminalization movement in its
431. People v. Ostrander, 295 N.Y.S.2d 293, 297 (Dutchess County Ct. 1968), affd, 302
N.Y.S.2d 998 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1969), quoting People v. Dugar, 235 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1962).
432. Best v. Macklin, 260 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (Fain. Ct. Dutchess County 1965).
433. People v. Haynes, 308 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (Ct. App. 1970).
434. 313 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1970).
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tracks. Jasen simply thought that "making available conciliation proce-
dures" under the Family Court Act to "informal and illicit relationships
... would clearly be contrary to public policy. '4 a5
The 1970 majority opinion in People v. Allen marked the beginning of
a sharp change in the judiciary's approach to family offense proceedings.
When one judge was asked, for example, to "follow the broad construc-
tion of the statute as enunciated in many lower court decisions," he
refused, observing that "in People v. Allen, . . . our highest court nar-
rowed further the construction of these categories... [and] limit[ed] the
jurisdiction of the Family Court" to cases involving a " 'legal interdepen-
dence' " between the parties.436 Thus, the judge held that an assault by a
stepfather upon his stepson could be tried in criminal court without any
initial reference to family court,437 while other judges held the same in
reference to assaults by a woman on her sister-in-law438 and by a 40-year-
old man on his 74-year-old mother.439 Several judges meanwhile fol-
lowed the Allen case in its specific holding that absent a lawful marriage
between a man and a woman, the family court had no jurisdiction over
any problems arising out of their relationship." 0 Finally, with the Court
of Appeals in 1972 leading the way, it became the uniform rule that
incest and other sex crimes between parents and children were cogniza-
ble only in criminal and not in family court."'
As the decade of the 1970s drew to a close, feminists were successfully
publicizing "societal concern" about brutality to women at the hands of
their husbands, 442 as well as to young children at the hands of their
fathers. In particular, concern arose that police would not respond to
requests for safeguarding made by or on behalf of a battered or
threatened wife, apparently because they did not want to become
involved in domestic disputes." 3 In one case, in which a woman's hus-
band had brandished a straight razor, torn off her blouse, and gouged her
face, neck, shoulders, and hands with his nails, in full public view, the
police advised her that " 'since this was a "family" matter there was
nothing they could do.'" Another woman, whose arm had been
435. Ibid., 723.
436. People v. Weisman, 339 N.Y.S.2d 482, 483-84 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1973), quoting
Allen, 313 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722.
437. See Weisman, 339 N.Y.S.2d 482, 483-84.
438. See Sarno v. O'Toole, 383 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Fain. Ct. Suffolk County 1976).
439. See Mouguin v. Mouguin, 398 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Fain. Ct. Rockland County 1977).
440. See Potter v. Bennett, 334 N.Y.S.2d 511 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972); People v. Dorns, 390
N.Y.S.2d 546 (Justice's Ct. Westchester County 1976), afid, 409 N.Y.S.2d 956 (App. Term 9th &
10th Dist. 1978); People v. Monsanto, 335 N.Y.S.2d 451 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1972).
441. See People v. Lewis, 329 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1972); People v. Webb, 382 N.Y.S.2d 369
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1976); People v. Abrams, 341 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Nassau County Ct. 1973). Cf.
Matter of Patrick B.P., 427 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Faro. Ct. Kings County 1980) (family court may not drop
quasi-criminal jurisdiction over 15-year-old who had raped and sodomized his younger sisters).
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sprained by her husband, was told by the police that " 'there is nothing
wrong with a husband hitting his wife if he does not use a weapon,' "
while a third woman who had been struck by her husband with a knife
heard an officer who refused her request to arrest him exclaim, "'Maybe
if I beat my wife, she'd act right too.'" As a result of the decriminaliza-
tion of family offenses, the only remedy these women possessed was to go
to family court and seek a protection order, but when they got to the
court they experienced little assistance and great delay." Even if a
woman obtained a protection order, it often did little good.
An egregious case was chronicled in Sorichetti v. City of New York. 5
It involved Frank Sorichetti, who prior to November 6, 1976 had been
arrested six times for drunkenness and family assaults. After he had
assaulted his wife Josephine with a knife in July 1975, she instituted a
divorce action, only to be threatened by him "that he would kill her and
the children if she proceeded with the divorce." In September she
obtained a protection order, but, on November 6, the order was amended
over Josephine's objections to allow Frank weekend visitation rights with
his daughter, Dina. On November 8, after Josephine had delivered Dina
to Frank at a police precinct, he threatened that he would kill both
Josephine and Dina before the weekend was over. Josephine informed
the police of the threats, showed them her protection order, and
demanded that they arrest Frank, but they refused. When on the next
day Frank failed to return Dina on time, Josephine again went to the
police and demanded repeatedly that they arrest Frank; when she
showed the protection order to a police lieutenant and demanded its
enforcement, he responded, " 'So what, what have you got there-they
mean nothing.'" Several hours later, when Frank's sister entered his
apartment, she found that Frank had attacked Dina with a fork, a knife,
and a screwdriver and had attempted to saw off her leg; Dina had been
slashed from head to toe and she had sustained severe multiple internal
injuries. 1 6
In response to disasters such as these, the courts gave victims of seri-
ous family violence a cause of action for damages against the municipal-
ity that had negligently failed to protect them." 7 More importantly, the
legislature, in order "to afford more effective relief to the 'battered
spouse,' ",448 amended Article 8 of the Family Court Act to give the vic-
tim of a family assault the option of instituting criminal proceedings
444. Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976-77 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977), rev'd, 407
N.Y.S.2d 165 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), aft'd, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1979).
445. 408 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1978), afid, 417 N.Y.S.2d 202 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1979), affd, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1985).
446. Ibid., 221-22.
447. See ibid.; see also Baker v. City of New York, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1966).
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rather than seeking conciliation in family court.' 9 This 1977 amend-
ment has been administered so as to give victims an effective choice of
the court in which they want to proceed and to make it easy for them to
proceed in criminal court.45° As a result of the 1977 amendment,
together with the earlier judicial narrowing of the original Article 8, the
curious attempt during the 1960s to decriminalize acts of family violence
in large part came to an end.
C. Prostitution
Just as conservatives and radical feminists had joined forces to trans-
form the law of rape and recriminalize family violence, the same forces
struggled to prevent the dawn of "those halcyon days"45' sought by male
libertines, when prostitutes would be available "in clean little stalls, med-
ically approved and at a price a workingman can afford." '452 It seemed
clear to radicals and conservatives alike that, even if "[s]ociety may not
be able to enforce morality,... it clearly can legislate it" and that judges
were "constrained to follow the current law, ' 453 not to void it as uncon-
stitutional or gut it through statutory interpretation.
Indeed, some judges in prostitution cases even went beyond current
law as they strove to reverse the process of decriminalization and thereby
enforce morality and protect women's rights. Thus, lower court judges
continued, even as they sometimes had during the 1950s and 1960s, to
distinguish both Gould and Choremi,4 54 in order to sustain prostitution
convictions based on evidence obtained through tapping the telephones
of call girls4 55 or through conversations held between defendants and
undercover police,45 6 even in cases in which sexual activity did not occur
or was not directly observed. Lower courts also extended prostitution
statutes to cover nontraditional defendants, such as the owner of an
employment agency who offered jobs requiring women to submit to
unlawful sexual intercourse or other lewd acts with their employers,457
and the owners of a massage parlor "where the female employees ...
manipulated the private parts of male customers to climax.
4 5
In part, the resistance to decriminalization of prostitution emerged out
of a conservative, moralistic sense that the activity constituted "an age-
449. See 1977 N.Y. LAws 449. See also 1978 N.Y. LAWS 628, 629.
450. See People v. Daniel T., 408 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 1978); People v.
Revell, 402 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1978).
451. Costello, 395 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142.
452. Brownmiller, "Speaking Out on Prostitution," 76.
453. Costello, 395 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142.
454. See Catalano, 205 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620 (distinguishing Gould); People v. Hansuld, 114
N.Y.S.2d 243, 246 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1952) (distinguishing Choremi).
455. See Hansuld, 114 N.Y.S.2d 243.
456. See Catalano, 205 N.Y.S.2d 618; People v. Williams, 237 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Oneida County Ct.
1963); People v. Bronski, 351 N.Y.S.2d 73 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
457. See Catalano, 205 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620.
458. People v. Block, 337 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 (Nassau County Ct. 1972).
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old problem" for society that had to be "eradicate[d]." 45 9 Solicitation by
prostitutes " 'caused citizens who venture into... public places to be the
unwilling victims of repeated harassment'" with the result that "'such
public places . . . become unsafe'" and "'neighborhoods'" become
" 'disrupted and... deteriorat[e].' "I Prostitution, it was said, "spread
.. disease, [led] ... to ancillary criminal conduct, encourage[d] criminal
organization," and thereby constituted "anti-social behavior offensive
and injurious to the community. ' 461
As the decade of the 1970s drew to a close, however, a new, radical
feminist opposition to prostitution began to emerge as the main force
behind the expansion of the criminal law. The new radical feminists
focused on prostitution not as an evil to society in general but as a harm
to women in particular; in the radical view, it was the prostitutes them-
selves who were victimized and exploited and needed to be protected.
Prostitution became a feminist issue, as women explained to the nation
that the housekeeper who had sex with her employer, or the teenager
who left home and hitchhiked to Manhattan, was not an equal who was
voluntarily engaging in sex with the men who provided her with money.
In this view, "'men create[d] the market,'" but "'the women who
suppl[ied] the demand [paid] the penalty.' "462 There was, according to
radical feminists, an "important state interest in proscribing" prostitu-
tion-an interest that was "emphasized," as one court noted, when the
prostitute before it was, as was the case in an increasingly massive
number of instances, "a fourteen year old child."" 3 The "imputation
that females who engage in misconduct, sexual or otherwise, ought to be
more censured... than males" ' 6 had to be put to rest and the women,
usually minors, who worked as prostitutes "protected . . . rather...
[than] penally punished.""' 5
New York had taken a step in that direction as early as 1965, when the
legislature declared patronizing a prostitute a crime,4 6 6 and occasional
cases had been brought under this statute against male customers.4 6 7
Then, in several brief experiments in New York City in the late 1970s,
female undercover police officers were assigned to catch male customers
and names of male customers were publicized,4 6' but the experiments
459. Bronski, 351 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75.
460. People v. Smith, 407 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (Ct. App. 1978), quoting 1976 legislative findings to
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (McKinney 1989).
461. In re P., 400 N.Y.S.2d 455, 466 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1977) (dictum), rev'd sub nom. In
re Dora P., 418 N.Y.S.2d 597 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1979).
462. Ibid., 461, quoting People v. Edwards, 180 N.Y.S. 631, 634 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County
1920).
463. In re Dora P., 418 N.Y.S.2d 597, 604.
464. A. v. City of New York, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33, 37 (Ct. App. 1972) (dictum).
465. In re P., 400 N.Y.S.2d 455, 468.
466. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.02 (McKinney 1989).
467. See Bronski, 351 N.Y.S.2d 73.
468. See "Female Officers Arrest Men Searching for Prostitutes," N. Y. Times, 4 July 1978, p. 8,
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ended in a wave of protest" 9 and law enforcement returned to a norm in
which prostitutes were ten times more likely than their customers to be
arrested.4 7 0  At the end of the decade the law of prostitution thus
remained in stasis, as feminists and proponents of decriminalization
fought to a standstill, with the result that moral traditionalists who found
"something offensive about having women perform sex for money ' 47I
continued to hold sway.
D. Pornography
Like the law of prostitution, the law of pornography remained in stasis
during the decade of the 1970s. This was true even though the two tradi-
tional "sides to the pornography issue: the conservative approach.., and
the liberal approach" were supplemented by "a third and feminist per-
spective: that pornography is the ideology of a culture which promotes
and condones rape, woman-battering, and other crimes of violence
against women. 472
Perhaps the most important reason for the static nature of pornogra-
phy law during the decade was that New York courts and especially the
New York legislature could do nothing to change it. The precise lines
separating lawful pornography from illegitimate obscenity had become a
matter for federal constitutional adjudication under the direction of a
deeply divided United States Supreme Court, which retained the same
basic test throughout the decades in question. In the 1950s the test was
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to the prurient interest, '4 73 while in the 1970s it was "whether the 'aver-
age person, applying contemporary community standards' would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
474
This formula, which one commentator has called "as unstable as it is
unintelligible, ' 475 required judges to search for a community consensus
by which to delimit the bounds of legitimate sexual expression. But, as
long as liberals saw "pornography as just one more aspect of our ever-
expanding human sexuality," while conservatives found it "immoral"
col. 1; "First 'John Hour' on WNYC Names Clients of Prostitutes," N.Y Times, 24 October 1979,
p. B3, col. 5.
469. See "Jail Terms Planned for Vice Customers," N. Y Times, 16 November 1977, p. D17, col.
5; "The 'John' Minute," N.Y Times, 26 October 1979, p. 30, col. 1; "WNYC May Discontinue
Broadcasts of 'John Hour'," N. Y Times, 9 November 1979, p. B3, col. 5.
470. See In re P., 400 N.Y.S.2d 455, 460.
471. Ibid., 468.
472. Lederer, "Introduction," in Take Back the Night, 19-20.
473. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
474. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230
(1972).
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and feminists understood it to "promote... violence against women, '
no consensus could emerge and the judicial search for one would be in
vain. Moreover, the federal constitutional stature of the community con-
sensus rule prevented the state legislature from doing what it had done in
regard to the law of rape and gender violence: altering the status quo
with a new, reform-oriented dynamic that produced a complete turn-
about in doctrinal direction. The ultimate result was that doctrine
remained incoherent, and pornography cases continued to be resolved
during the 1970s in the same unprincipled, ad hoc fashion that we
observed in Part II-D above.
E. Sodomy
The judiciary's liberalization of criminal laws prohibiting homosexual
acts also met with conservative, moralistic opposition during the 1960s.
Thus, when the Appellate Division in People v. Maggio4" extended the
Randall case to cover oral as well as anal sex, holding that "only the one
whose penis is inserted into a body orifice of another" is guilty of sod-
omy, 478 it generated a sharp dissent, premised on the linguistic distinc-
tion in the Penal Law that while anal sodomy could be committed only
by the anus, oral sodomy could be committed "not only 'by the mouth'
but also 'with the mouth.'" To keep this "language" from "becom[ing]
superfluous," the dissent believed it necessary to hold that "the one
whose mouth is used may also commit the crime. ' 47 9 When the Court of
Appeals, in a 4-3 vote, reversed Maggio on the basis of this dissenting
opinion,48 0 it was clear that something other than the parsing of language
was going on. What had occurred was that the legislature, in response to
conservative moralistic pressures, had amended the Penal Law to make
all participants in anal or oral sex guilty of sodomy,41 and that legisla-
tion, together with the "overrul[ing]" of Randall by Maggio, "cleared
up" the "doubt" that "the language of some parts of the opinion" in
Randall had created.482
As the courts continued, as they always had, to face cases involving
oral and anal sex acts in public rest rooms 48 3 and solicitations for such
sex made to police officers,484 to other men,48 5 and to children as young
476. Lederer, "Introduction," in Take Back the Night, 19-20.
477. 228 N.Y.S.2d 791.
478. Ibid., 793.
479. Ibid., 794, quoting statutory language (emphasis in original).
480. Maggio, 235 N.Y.S.2d 377.
481. See People v. Katt, 234 N.Y.S.2d 988, 989-90 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1962).
482. People v. Henry, 239 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1963).
483. See People v. Sanabria, 249 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1964); People v.
Anonymous, 415 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Justice's Ct. Westchester County 1979).
484. See People v. Hale, 203 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1960).
485. See People v. Willmott, 324 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Justice's Ct. Suffolk County 1971).
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as eight,48 6 conservative concerns for the "rights" of "the 'public' " con-
tinued to surface.4 7 In particular, the courts worried that "infants of
tender years" might witness sex acts.488 Worst of all in the eyes of con-
servatives, the courts continued to confront cases in which men had sex
with boys "of vulnerable early adolescence, 13 and 14 years of age," and
they began to perceive these teens as "child victims" 48 9 rather than the
"half-witted youth[s] ' 4" they had once appeared to be. In an effort to
protect such victims, the Court of Appeals sub silentio even overruled
People v. Doyle, by holding that a boy under the age of consent was inca-
pable of consenting to an act of sodomy, was thereby incapable of being
an accomplice in such an act, and could accordingly provide all the testi-
mony that was needed, without corroboration, to convict an adult
defendant of the act.491 And finally, as the courts began to perceive chil-
dren participating in homosexual acts as victims, they began to see the
men of "economic status" and "good positions" who appeared before
them charged as defendants not as upstanding citizens of education and
culture but as exhibitionists hoping to be "observed by an innocent mem-
ber of the public. 492
Nonetheless, there remained judges who supported claims for the
decriminalization of private, consensual sodomy, and in the late 1970s
they began to write opinions proclaiming the existence of a constitutional
right of privacy or an equal protection right to engage privately in oral
and anal sex.493 Other judges, in contrast, continued to find homosexual
acts a fit subject for legislative prohibition,4 94 even if they believed that
unmarried heterosexuals had a constitutional right to engage in anal and
oral sex. 49 In the face of this division of lower court opinion, the Court
of Appeals in 1977 initially refused to pass upon the issue of the legisla-
486. See People v. Spencer, 322 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Crim. Ct. Queens County 1971).
487. Anonymous, 415 N.Y.S.2d 921, 923.
488. Ibid., 924.
489. Fielding, 385 N.Y.S.2d 17.
490. Deschessere, 74 N.Y.S. 761, 764.
491. See Fielding, 385 N.Y.S.2d 17. Fielding, it should be noted, was decided after the statutory
changes in the law of corroboration of sex crimes discussed in the text at notes 413-22 above. Like
the cases discussed in that section, Fielding should be read as a response to the new legislative policy.
As late as 1972, the court was applying the old rule requiring corroboration in the case of consensual
but not forcible sodomy. See People v. Thompson, 335 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1972).
492. Anonymous, 415 N.Y.S.2d 921, 924.
493. See In re P., 400 N.Y.S.2d 455, 464-66. See also People v. Jose L., 417 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Crim.
Ct. N.Y. County 1979), declaring prohibitions on private, consensual sodomy "archaic" and a result
of a "legislative failure of courage" when the Penal Law was amended in 1965, and hoping "that we
in this state have come a long way in the fifteen years since." Ibid., 658-59. However, the judge in
Jose L refused to decide whether a constitutional right existed to engage in sodomy in private, since
Jose L. had engaged in his act with a female prostitute in the rear of a van parked on a public street
and open to public view.
494. See People v. Mehr, 383 N.Y.S.2d 798 (App. Term 9th & 10th Dists. 1976); People v. Rice,
383 N.Y.S.2d 799 (App. Term 9th & 10th Dists. 1976); People v. Johnson, 355 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268
(Buffalo City Ct. 1974) (dictum).
495. See Johnson, 355 N.Y.S.2d 266.
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ture's power to prohibit private, consensual homosexual acts.49 6 But
then three years later, in People v. Onofre,497 the court did decide the
question, holding unconstitutional the state's legislation criminalizing
consensual homosexual relations.
The majority opinion by Hugh R. Jones, an upstate Republican
appointed to the court by Nelson Rockefeller in 1973, held that the legis-
lation violated the right to privacy, which was itself derived from several
textual sources, including the federal due process clause.4 98 Jones began
by observing that the right of privacy "is not, as a literal reading of the
phrase might suggest, the right to maintain secrecy with respect to one's
affairs or personal behavior; rather it is a right of independence in mak-
ing certain kinds of important decisions."4 99 Given that courts had
extended the right of privacy to cover "individual decisions as to indul-
gence in acts of sexual intimacy by unmarried persons" and the "satisfac-
tion of sexual desires by resort to material condemned as obscene..
when done in a cloistered setting," Jones could see no reason for not
extending the right further to people seeking "sexual gratification from
what at least once was commonly regarded as 'deviant' conduct." 5" Nor
did three justifications put forward by the state in support of its legisla-
tion carry any credence with him. He rejected out of hand the first claim
that sodomy led to physical injury, finding no evidence in support
thereof. Since courts sustaining privacy rights in other contexts had
given no weight to the "moral indignation among broad segments of our
community" arising from the private viewing of pornography or the use
of contraceptives by unmarried people,5"1 Jones rejected the second justi-
fication that "disapproval [of sodomy] by a majority of the populace"
could constitute "a valid basis for intrusion by the State in an area of
important personal decision. ' 32 Finally, he rejected the argument that
prohibiting sodomy would protect "the institution of marriage, venerable
and worthy as is that estate," observing:
Certainly there is no suggestion that the one is a substitute or alter-
native for the other nor is any empirical data submitted which dem-
onstrates that marriage is nothing more than a refuge for persons
deprived by legislative fiat of the option of consensual sodomy
outside the marital bond.50 3
With its decision in Onofre the Court of Appeals carried to ultimate
fruition, but only for gay men, the new sexual liberalism that developed
496. See People v. Rice, 395 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1977).
497. 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
498. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
499. Onofre, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 949.
500. Ibid., 951.
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after 1940. In the cases involving homosexuals, the Court of Appeals
was prepared, when only consenting adults were involved and sex acts
between them took place in private, initially in cases like Doyle to manip-
ulate procedural rules and construe statutes, and ultimately in cases like
Onofre to create a constitutional right under the rubric of privacy so as to
give men freedom to engage with each other in whatever sexual behavior
they enjoyed. In the one limited area of homosexuality, New York law
recognized the legitimacy of men's ever-expanding sexuality and the ille-
gitimacy of governmental attempts to dominate men and transform them
into something other than what they made of themselves.
V. CONCLUSION
It is necessary to conclude by asking the same question about the
changes in the law of sex crimes occurring during the 1970s as that
which was asked earlier about the changes occurring in the 1950s: what
deeper, parallel transformations in society and ideology can help explain
them? More specifically, we must ask why the impetus in the 1950s for
sexual autonomy and fulfillment came to full fruition only in regard to
homosexuality, whereas on other issues-prostitution and pornogra-
phy-the impetus came to a halt, while on still others-rape and gender-
related violence-its direction was totally reversed.
Any analysis of the uniqueness of Onofre's outcome must begin by
recognizing that New York is not simply the United States in micro-
cosm. As noted at the outset of this article, the forces that impinge on
the law would come together differently in New York than in the nation
at large. In particular, New York City would have less weight in the
nation's councils than in the state's. Thus, when the United States
Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick5  considered the same issue that
the Court of Appeals had resolved in Onofre, it reached the opposite
result. There was simply less support in New York and on the Court of
Appeals than in the nation at large and on the Supreme Court for what
Chief Justice Warren Burger labelled "millennia of moral teaching."5 °5
The liberal disposition in favor of granting men freedom to pursue an
ever-expanding sexuality could more readily triumph over traditional,
conservative moral values in New York than in the nation as a whole.
Explaining why the liberal value of individual autonomy triumphed in
New York whereas it failed to triumph in the nation at large does not,
however, solve any important, interesting puzzle. The real puzzle arising
out of Onofre is why liberal individualism triumphed more completely in
the context of homosexual than heterosexual privacy. Addressing that
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puzzle, in turn, demands recourse to the central concepts at the core of
this essay-the concepts of equality, freedom, and domination.
Gay men were without question an underclass in New York as
recently as the 1970s. Homosexuals as late as that decade still had to
hide their orientation if they wanted to practice most professions, reside
in most neighborhoods, or otherwise participate in mainstream economic
and social life. Heterosexual domination took the form of driving gay
men into the closet."1  And the liberal paradigm's response to that domi-
nation was easy: grant gay men equality with heterosexual men, give
them the freedom to engage in the sexual practices they desired and to
live the same lives as others, and thus put an end to domination. Onofre,
which was a step toward equality, freedom, and an end to domination, fit
neatly into the liberal paradigm. While gay liberation called for the
rejection of millennia of Judeo-Christian moral teaching, its achievement
seemingly would hurt no one.
Hence most New Yorkers could easily accept homosexual equality,
and no one except the conservative supporters of conventional morality
would stand in opposition to it. Conservatives, moreover, would take
their stand not on the basis of tangible self-interest but only in support of
claimed moral truths. Thus, the battlelines over homosexuality were cast
between a minority seeking to attain equality, in order to end domination
and attain its freedom, and a majority standing for nothing but continued
adherence to received traditions.
It should also be noted that "a healthy interplay [developed] between
the gay movement and the feminist movement,"5 °7 as radical feminists
joined with homosexuals to demand "an end to social degradation and
violence against lesbians and gay men."'50 8 Some of these radicals, it
should further be noted, acted out of self-interest. Finding "[i]ntercourse
with men as we know them ... increasingly impossible" and "conven-
tional heterosexual behavior" to be "the worst betrayal of our common
humanity," 5' some radical women began to "consider the fact that
there's no reason why one shouldn't love a woman."5 10 In addition,
many feminists supported male as well as female homosexuality out of a
different self-interest, rooted in an understanding that men were "person-
ally threatened" by "homosexuality" since it "contained an implicit
threat to sexist ideology" and thereby cast doubt upon men's "place of
power in society with women. 51
506. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 115-25, 158-75, 207-09, 219, 238-39.
507. "Loving Another Woman," transcript of radio broadcast, in Radical Feminism, ed. Koedt,
et al., 85, 93.
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510. "Loving Another Woman," 91.
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It was only on the issue of homosexuality, however, that radical femi-
nists stood in support of the liberal individualist paradigm of sexual free-
dom. On all the other issues considered in this essay-pornography,
prostitution, rape, and gender-related violence-the radicals stood
against individualism as they strove to unmask liberalism's goal of sexual
freedom as a mere veil for male sexual aggression. In the language of one
radical, "the much acclaimed 'sexual freedom' of the last few decades"
amounted to nothing more than a conversion of "woman to 'cunt'-
thing, commodity, matter"; sexual freedom was merely a "masculine sen-
sibility" focusing upon "the disgust, the contempt, the hostility, the vio-
lence, and the sense of filth" through which men "just 'fuck' women and
discard them, much as one might avail oneself of sanitary facilities-
Kleenex or toilet paper, for example."5"2
By their effort to unmask male sensibilities and interests, radical
women, of course, declared their own different sensibilities and interests.
By pointing to the "truth that there is a split between the female and the
male," 3 that "women's concepts of the world are much different than
men's," and that any "male view of the world ha[d] its opposite in a
female view,"514 the radical feminists proclaimed their faith that the
interests and sensibilities of men and women were inevitably at war. The
only way by which women could, in the radicals' view, prevent men from
triumphing over them and dominating them, was for them to triumph
over and dominate men. In announcing their goal to "change men"5 5
and make men "excise everything in them that they now value as distinc-
tively 'male,' ",516 the radicals made it plain that they intended to end
what they viewed as their subordination by establishing their
domination.
Once radical feminists ceased demanding equality in the form of
obtaining the same rights as men, equality collapsed as a coherent con-
cept in regard to gender issues. Indeed, the identification of interests and
sensibilities on the part of men and women which were inevitably at war
with each other destroyed the possibility that any moral or legal concept
could mediate the conflict between the sexes. As different groups-men
and women; homosexuals and heterosexuals; radicals, liberals, and con-
servatives-developed competing and incommensurable paradigms of
sexuality, the specific theoretical concepts that they appropriated to the
paradigms, such as conventional ideas of sexual morality, classical goals
512. Millett, Sexual Politics, 294-97.
513. Barbara Burris, "The Fourth World Manifesto," in Radical Feminism, ed. Koedt, et al.,
322, 355.
514. Ibid., 340.
515. Carol Hanisch, "A Critique of the Miss America Protest," in Notes from the Second Year:
Women's Liberation: Major Writings of the Radical Feminists (New York: Radical Feminism, 1970),
88, quoted in Judith Hole and Ellen Levine, Rebirth of Feminism (New York: Quadrangle Books,
1971), 124.
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of autonomy and equality, and newer visions of an end to subordination,
ceased to serve as instruments for persuading each other. Instead, the
concepts became rhetorical ploys for keeping the committed in the fold
and for translating self-interest into arguments that were acceptable in
the political process. In the face of divergent paradigms that often made
it impossible for competing groups even to communicate with each other,
the only thing opposing groups could do was to join in rhetorical efforts
to express their self-interest in politically acceptable dialogue, to see
which group could make the greatest political noise, and thereby to enlist
government institutions to decide issues in their favor.
The developments of the 1970s in the law of rape, gender-related vio-
lence, pornography, and prostitution must be understood as responses to
such rhetorical battles. When feminists proposed changes in the law of
rape and gender violence and gave politically viable arguments in sup-
port of their proposals, men who profited by such rape and violence
could find nothing acceptable to say in response. The result was a series
of statutory changes and judicial extensions beneficial to women. In con-
trast, when radicals sought to alter the law of prostitution and pornogra-
phy, men and even some women who valued existing practices talked
loudly about sexual freedom and freedom of speech. Their rhetoric was
loud enough to neutralize the talk both of radicals and of conservative
moralists, and to keep the law in stasis.
These conclusions suggest larger hypotheses to which I shall turn in
work to come. They suggest that demands for equality, individual free-
dom, and an end to habits of domination, constituted a cohesive ideology
during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. That ideology, in turn, produced
transformative legal change during the decades in question. In the late
1960s, however, ideological cohesion collapsed, and different groups
began to articulate diverse and competing sensibilities and interests.
That competition, in turn, produced an ideological stalemate. With this
stalemate, dynamic legal change became increasingly difficult to achieve,
the status quo became reified, and a new conservatism set in.
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